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ABSTRACT

Three Essays on Environmental- and Spatial-Based Valuation
of Urban Land and Housing

by

Lu Liu, Doctor of Philosophy
Utah State University, 2010

Major Professor: Dr. Paul Jakus
Department: Applied Economics

This dissertation attempts to provide a comprehensive examination on the
non-market valuation of the effect of open space amenities and local public
infrastructure on the value of urban land and housing with both spatial heterogeneity
and project heterogeneity.

The demand for raw land is a derived demand for

housing built on it. Therefore, we need to examine the land market and the housing
market together.

On the one hand, we estimate the value of urban land in a market

that does not satisfy the usual assumptions of a competitive market structure as well
as incentive incompatibility issues for transaction participants, with an application to
a Chinese regional wholesale land market.

These two violations to the traditional

hedonic theory also generate two separate valuations on land with differentiated

iv
characteristics.

On the other hand, we utilize the relative plane coordinates system,

the three-dimensional distances, as well as the aggregate weight matrix, to implement
the spatial hedonic estimation on the high-rise residential buildings in the same
regional housing retail market in China.

After these two steps, this dissertation,

therefore, focuses on the profit maximization behavior of the property developer,
which is the key role to link the factor market (i.e., the land market) and the
commodity market (i.e., the housing market) together. Two methods are then
employed to implement the hypothesis test on the hedonic price estimation including
both inputs and outputs. First, a set of partial derivatives of the profit function with
respect to various characteristics gives us the relationship between the marginal
valuations in the land market and in the housing market.

Second, we introduce a

joint estimation approach that we call the spatial full information maximum
likelihood (SFIML), which considers the land market, the housing market, and the
property developer's profit maximization behavior all together in the estimation.
Finally, we conduct a hypothesis test in both of these two scenarios to examine the
validity of our linked markets assumption on the hedonic price estimation.
(175 pages)
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

It is commonly acknowledged that modern hedonic theory should be credited to
Rosen (1974), who proposed an equilibrium model of product differentiation.

The

hedonic approach has seen widespread applications to help value: air quality, open /
green space, public transportation, water proximity and quality, and planned local
infrastructure.

Traditional hedonic theory relies upon two critical assumptions: the

competitive market structure and "matching" property prices with the market
participants' true valuations.

If the market, however, is characterized by a

monopolistic seller, then we do not have a set of offer curves as the traditional
hedonic theory predicts. Instead, we end up with only one offer function which stands
alone in the market.

In addition, in some special cases such as an English auction

setting, the actual sales price may not represent both the seller's and the buyer's true
valuations since a possible auction premium may exist.

In either case, we cannot

directly use the observed sales price to estimate the hedonic equilibrium and implicit
marginal prices.

Under these market conditions, the sales price fails to represent the

true valuation of the market participants, due to the monopolistic seller and the
incentive incompatibility issue in the English auction.

To our knowledge, no study

has been done to examine the hedonic valuation when confronting these two
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violations to traditional assumptions of hedonic theory.
In Chapter 2, data on the land market in China provides us with an opportunity to
examine the two violations.

The Chinese regional land market is characterized by a

monopolistic land seller (the local government) and multiple buyers (developers) who
purchase land via English auction.
features in two ways.

We are able to take advantage of these market

First, the "asking price" of the government seller is used to

derive its true valuation, so that one can estimate the offer function of the monopoly
seller.

On the buyer's side, the winning bid does not necessarily reflect the true

valuation of the buyers.

But with the known asking price and winning bid, the

incentive incompatibility properties of the English auction can be exploited to recover
the true valuation of the buyers.
Our empirical analysis looks at the marginal implicit values for characteristics of
raw, developable land. The characteristics considered include development
restrictions regarding housing density and minimum green space, in situ and planned
infrastructure such as parks and public transportation systems, and neighborhood
effects.

Because no equilibrium price function exists, we conduct the analysis

separately for the land seller (the local government) and buyers (land developers).
We find that, contrary to standard hedonic theory, the marginal implicit characteristics
are not equal across buyers and sellers.
The natural extension of the study in Chapter 2 is to examine the retail housing
market, i.e., look at the hedonic equilibrium in the structures built upon the raw land
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considered in Chapter 2.

The Chinese regional housing market consists of housing

units in different housing projects.

Unlike the relatively "sparse" residential

development pattern common in the US and other countries, the style of residential
development in China is more concentrated and dense.

In fact, many large cities in

Asia develop in a similar manner, and their residential buildings have the "high-rise"
shape.

Over the past 20 years, high-rise residential development has expanded from

the coastal region to the inland region, and it is currently the prevalent
urban-development pattern in China. The high-rise residential pattern challenges the
traditional spatial hedonic techniques because the standard two-dimensional concept
in space does not fit the situation well. To our knowledge, no study has been done
to conduct the hedonic estimation with respect to the high-rise residential pattern.
We adapt our spatial econometric model to reflect the potential for
three-dimensional spatial relationships within a high-rise apartment complex, as well
as the two-dimensional spatial relationships between complexes.

Our equilibrium

hedonic price function explains apartment sales prices as a function of
project-specific attributes such as housing density and in situ and planned
infrastructure such as parks and public transportation, and apartment-specific
characteristics such as the size of the apartment and the floor on which it is located.
While Rosen (1974) and many subsequent studies have focused on the different
characteristics of the output, Palmquist (1989) extends the study into the
differentiated factors of production with a focus on land.

Palmquist treats land as a
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differentiated production input, and assumes that, this differentiated factor (land, in
this example) is purchased by a buyer following a derived demand for the input.

To

our knowledge, while most previous hedonic studies focus on the "final product"
(retail housing), the critical role of the property developer has long been ignored.

In

fact, it is the property developer that links the land and housing markets together.
Although the studies of Palmquist (1989) and Wu (2006) (among others) have shed
light on the theoretical link between the factor market and commodity market, to our
knowledge no study has attempted to empirically link the derived demand for land to
the supply of retail housing.
Chapter 4, therefore, focuses on the profit maximization behavior of the property
developer. The property developer is assumed to earn a positive profit from the
English auction where the raw land parcel is traded with the local government,
besides the common competitive market assumption.

This profit arises from the

premium due to the incentive incompatibility problem with the English auction, since
the winner only needs to pay the amount at which the second highest bidder quits.
With the developer's true valuation of land derived from Chapter 2, we test whether
the parameters from the derived demand are consistent with those of the supply.
Both separate estimation and joint estimation approaches are employed in the
empirical models.

A set of partial derivatives of the profit function with respect to

various characteristics gives us the relationship between the marginal valuations in
the land and housing markets, which then present a link between the estimation
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parameters in these two markets, and could be considered as constraints in the
estimation parameters.
We also use a joint estimation approach that we call the spatial full information
maximum likelihood (SFIML), which considers the land market, the housing market
and the property developer's profit maximization behavior all together in the
estimation.

We use the results in the corresponding separate estimation in the

housing market as the constraint on the SFIML parameters.
The results of the separate estimation model reject the null hypothesis that the
calculated constraints are valid.

In contrast, the joint estimation model fails to reject

the null hypothesis, which provides a positive signal confirming the theoretical
linkage in the hedonic price estimation.

References
Palmquist, R. B., 1989. Land as a differentiated factor of production: a hedonic model
and its implications for welfare measurement. Land Economics 65 (February),
23-28.
Rosen, S., 1974. Hedonic prices and implicit markets: product differentiation in pure
competition. Journal of Political Economy 82 (1), 34–55.
Wu, J., 2006. Environmental amenities, urban sprawl, and community characteristics.
Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 52 (2) (September),
527-547, doi: 10.1016/j.jeem.2006.03.003.
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CHAPTER 2
A SPATIAL HEDONIC STUDY FOR MONOPOLY SUPPLIED URBAN LAND
VIA ENGLISH AUCTION: A CASE STUDY OF CHENGDU, CHINA

Abstract
This study estimates the effect of open space and local public infrastructure on
the value of urban land in a market that does not satisfy the usual assumptions of the
traditional hedonic theory.

Our study uses data obtained from a Chinese regional

land market characterized by a monopolistic land seller (the local government) and
multiple buyers (developers) who purchase land via English auction.

The "asking

price" of the government seller is used to derive its true valuation, so that one can
estimate the offer function of the monopoly seller.

For developers, the winning bid

does not necessarily reflect the true valuation of the buyers due to the incentive
incompatibility properties of the English auction.

Following Paarsch (1997), we use

the difference between the asking price and the winning bid to calculate a "bid
premium." The premium is then used to recover the distribution of the buyer's true
valuation.

Our estimates thus reveal the true marginal valuation for amenities and

infrastructure associated with a given property by both buyers and sellers which,
under our market conditions need not be equal because the usual hedonic equilibrium
does not apply.

In our study of land sold for residential development in Chengdu,

China, we find that the seller and buyers differ in the marginal valuation of these land
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characteristics.

In addition, our study can be used to shed light on the "land

financing" issue in China, land sales are a primary tool of local public financing.

1. Introduction
This study estimates the effect of open space and local public infrastructure on
the value of urban land in a market that does not satisfy the usual assumptions of the
traditional hedonic theory.

Our study uses data obtained from a Chinese regional

land market characterized by a monopolistic land seller (the local government) and
multiple buyers (developers) who purchase land via English auction. We take
advantage of these market features in two ways.

First, the "asking price" of the

government seller is used to derive its true valuation, so that one can estimate the
offer function of the monopoly seller.

On the buyer's side, the winning bid does not

necessarily reflect the true valuation of the buyers.

Given the known asking price

and winning bid, the incentive incompatibility properties of the English auction can
be exploited to recover the true valuation of the buyers.

The implicit prices of the

offer and bid functions reveal the true marginal valuation for amenities and
infrastructure associated with a given property.

In our study of land sold for

residential development in Chengdu, China, we find that the monopolistic seller and
buyers differ in the marginal valuation of these land characteristics.
The paper proceeds as follows: first, we briefly review the traditional hedonic
theory under standard theoretical assumptions, along with a review of how this model
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has been applied to the valuation of open space amenities and infrastructure.

After

discussing the land market in China and the City of Chengdu, we present our data.
We then discuss the properties of an English auction and its application to our study.
Our empirical section consists of three parts: a Tobit model to estimate the auction
premium paid by the buyers and its subsequent transformation into the distribution of
the buyers' valuation, an empirical model for the monopolist's offer function, and,
finally, a model of the bid function using the land buyers' derived true valuation.

2. Literature Review
It is commonly acknowledged that hedonic theory should be credited to Rosen
(1974), who proposed an equilibrium model of product differentiation.

In a

competitive market setting, goods are assumed to be valued for their utility-bearing
characteristics, and the interactions of buyers and sellers over multiple attributes yield
the hedonic equilibrium price function.

The hedonic price function is an envelope

of the tangent points between the offer functions and the bid functions.

The hedonic

approach has been seen widespread application so, for this study, we will initially
focus our literature review on open / green space, public transportation, water
proximity, and planned local infrastructure.

There are many studies that have shed

light on our research, some of which we review below.
Anderson and West (2006) estimate the effects of proximity to open space on
home sales price in the Minneapolis–St. Paul metropolitan area.

They measure the
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size of the nearest amenity of different types in acres, such as neighborhood park,
special park, golf course, cemetery, lake.

Although many recent studies measure the

total quantity of open space surrounding a home within a given distance or at multiple
scales, they prefer to use the distance to the nearest open space, since they include the
block group fixed effects, and homes in the same census block group often have the
same overall pattern of surrounding land use.
each home to the nearest CBD.

They also calculate the distance from

Again, home value is regressed on structural

attributes, neighborhood characteristics as well as location, and environmental
amenities.

Census block group data are used as control variables.

A log-log

functional form is used in the estimation, with results showing that the value of
proximity to open space is higher in neighborhoods that are characterized as: dense,
near the CBD, high-income, high-crime, or home to many children.

Anderson and

West also find that the sales price of an average home increases with the proximity to
neighborhood parks, special parks, and golf courses.

However, they find that these

results are sensitive to the inclusion of local fixed effects.
Asabere and Huffman (2009) measure the relative impacts of trails, greenbelts,
and the interaction of trails with greenbelts on home values for over 10,000 sales of
residential property occurring in and around Bexar County, Texas.

A distinct feature

of their study is that they use dummy variables to denote almost all the open space
variables such as presence of a trail in the neighborhood, a greenbelt in the
neighborhood, both trail and greenbelt, a golf course, a playground, tennis court, and
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a swimming pool.

Actual distances from trail or greenbelt are measured based on

the MLS database.

In addition, they also consider additional sales-related variables

including time-of-sale in sequential months, and type of financing (conventional
versus others).

A semi-log functional form is used in the estimation.

Their study

shows that trails, greenbelts, and trails with greenbelts are associated with roughly
2%, 4%, and 5% price premiums, respectively.

The authors, therefore, confirm that

the home value would be further enhanced when greenbelts are used to buffer trails
and hence create greenways.
Bolitzer and Netusil (2000) examine the net effect of open space proximity on a
home's sale price in urbanized Portland.

They include all publicly owned open

spaces and those privately owned large open spaces that exceed 10 acres.
parks make up the majority of open spaces in this study.

Public

Proximity to an open space,

open-space type and distance from the house to the central business district are
obtained using a geographic information system (GIS) database.

An "open space"

dummy variable was created to reflect the presence of any open space within 1500
feet of a home.

The sales price of a home is then regressed on structural

characteristics, environmental characteristics, open space characteristics, and other
neighborhood characteristics.

Both linear and semi-log functional forms are used

in regression and the results from the semi-log specification are preferred.

Their

results show that proximity to an open-space of certain type can have a positive and
significant effect on a home's sale price in their study area, but they do not find that
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the negative externalities associated with open space adjacency dominate the positive
externalities (as was found in other empirical studies).
Geoghegan et al. (1997) include two ecological landscape indices (diversity and
fragmentation) to hedonic valuation on land use.

In their study, they introduce a

diversity index based on Shannon index and a fragmentation index which is the
perimeter to air area ratio, fractal dimension (edge to interior) and the edge length
between land use.

They measure the two ecological indices at both a 0.1km and 1.0

km radius surrounding each housing transaction to capture the scale issue.

Besides

this buffer, they also consider structural characteristics (age of house, type of
construction material, lot size, and whether lot is waterfront or not), locational
characteristics (i.e., distance to the central business district, CBD), and accessibility
(the distance to the nearest major road).

Their study area is the 30-mile radius of the

Washington DC, which they think is the maximum possible commute range of the
market. Both census data on ethnic composition and income and GIS data on streets,
highways, and hydrological systems are used.

Without doing a tedious process of

address-matching, they use a 3000 ft by 4000 ft size grid, and then geo-code them
into GIS.

In addition, they use dummy variable to capture differential tax rates and

public services.

In their regression, natural log functional form is used.

Their

research has found that for a smaller buffer, the marginal contribution of more open
space is both positive and significant; while for a larger buffer, the effect is both
negative and significant.
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Irwin (2002) addresses the identification problems in a hedonic pricing model
due to the endogenous explanatory variables, spatial error autocorrelation and
multicollinearity.

She distinguishes six types of open space by individuals'

perceptions of neighboring open space, namely whether it is in a preserved state or
developable.

She also divides the open space into land that could be developed at

anytime (cropland, pasture, or forest) versus land that has been permanently
preserved in some way (privately owned land whose development rights have been
sold or land that is publicly held).

Irwin considers land ownership and land use as

well, using a 400-meter radius around residential parcels as the study area.

She also

considers the proportion of neighboring land that is in low, medium, and high density
residential development and commercial or industrial land use to capture the
externality effects of neighboring development. Distance to the two major centers in
the study area, i.e., Washington, DC and Baltimore is measured along major roads.
A dummy variable is used to denote whether a residential property is located within
one mile of the airport to examine the noise disamenity as well.

In addition, several

socioeconomic variables from the 1990 U.S. Census of Population measuring at the
block group level and dummies for three of the four counties in the study area are
also included.
In Irwin's study, residential sales price is regressed on structural characteristics
associated with the house, neighborhood / locational variables, as well as
neighborhood land use variables.

Irwin compares log-log, semi-log functional
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forms, and a linear version of the Box-Cox transformation.

Results show that the

log-log and semi-log specifications do a better job than the linear model and a slight
preference is given to the log-log model by ordinary least square estimation.
Privately owned conservation lands, publicly owned conservation lands, nonmilitary
open space have positive and significant effects on the value of neighboring
residential properties relative to developable pasture land. Notably, Irwin randomly
draws a subset of the data to control the inefficiency of the estimates caused by the
remaining spatial error correlation.

She first defines the nearest neighbors as parcels

that are within 100 meters of each other and then uses 200, 400, and 600 meters of
each other to test model robustness.

She finds that the spillover effects from

preserved open space are significantly greater than those associated with developable
farmland and forest, and that pasture land generates a significantly greater spillover
effect on residential property values than that of neighboring forests.
Leggett and Bockstael (2000) estimate the effects of water quality on residential
land values along the Chesapeake Bay, in Anne Arundel County, Maryland.

They

use fecal coliform bacteria, which has serious human health implications, as a
measure of water quality.

They collect data for sales of waterfront property between

July 1993 and August 1997 from the State of Maryland's Tax Assessment data base.
Distance is measured from a parcel to the closest water quality monitoring stations.
The authors calculate an inverse distance-weighted average of fecal coliform counts
based on data from the nearest three monitoring stations for each waterfront property.
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In addition, the appraised value of the structure by the tax assessors is also included
in the regression.
well.

They include lot size and its square as explanatory variables as

Commuting distances to the nearby cities (Annapolis, Baltimore, and

Washington, DC) are measured using ARC/INFO software along road networks
digitized in the Census Bureau's Tiger Line Files.

Additional variables include

black population as a percent of total population and percent of owner occupied
housing in the Census block group.
In the regression, log-log, semi-log, inverse semi-log, and linear functional forms
are compared.

Leggett and Bockstael estimate two alternative dependent variables

for each of the four specifications: one is market transaction price minus assessed
value of the structure and, the other one is the market transaction price itself.

The

first one is explained as the "residual" land price. They use ordinary least squares to
estimate all of the eight specifications, and find that both heteroscedasticity and
spatial autocorrelation are in the OLS results.

They argue that it is difficult to

resolve these two problems at the same time, so they first focus on four specifications
which do not exhibit heteroscedasticity and then re-estimate these specifications
using spatial error model to correct spatial correlation.

In the end, the inverse

semi-log functional form is chosen to conduct a comparative study in welfare change.
The model indicates that improvements in water quality can have a positive and
significant effect on property values.
Lutzenhiser and Netusil (2001) estimate the effect of proximity to different open
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space types on a home's sale price in the city of Portland, Oregon.

Open spaces are

assigned to one of five categories: urban parks, natural area parks, specialty
parks/facilities, golf courses, and cemeteries.

Dummy variables were created to

reflect the interaction between seven different zones that range in size from 200 to
300 feet and the open space types.

Home prices are regressed on structural

characteristics, environmental characteristics, neighborhood characteristics.

The

estimated effects are composed of three factors: the open space variable interacted
with distance, and acreage and acreage squared interacted with open space type.
Box-Cox transformation of the dependent variable is used in the estimation, where a
maximum likelihood value for the parameter λ in the transformation is estimated.
Their findings show that homes located within 1,500 feet of a natural area park,
where more than 50% of the park is preserved in native and/or natural vegetation,
have the largest increase in sale price.

In addition, Lutzenhiser and Netusil show

that natural area parks require the largest acreage to maximize sale price, and
specialty parks are found to have the largest potential effect on a home's sale price.
Mahan et al. (2000) use the hedonic property price model to estimate the value of
wetland amenities in the Portland, Oregon, for the metropolitan area with over 14,000
home sales records.

Arc/Info GIS is used to generate the data, and wetland

characteristics are based on the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service's National Wetlands
Inventory in Oregon.

Their major land-cover categories include forested,

scrub-shrub, emergent-vegetation, open-water wetlands, lakes and rivers or streams.
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They record the size in acres of nearest wetland of any type (excluding lakes, rivers,
and streams) and use a dummy variable to denote the type of nearest wetland.

A

raster system is used to calculate the Euclidean distance in feet from the centroid of
the tax lot to the nearest edge of a feature, where all data are arranged in grid cells
(52-feet square for each).

They also measure the natural log of distance to the

nearest open water linear wetland, water areal wetland, stream, river, lake, and
improved public park.

Housing prices are regressed on environmental amenities

associated with a specific location, structural characteristics, neighborhood
characteristics, and market segment variables.

Notable neighborhood characteristics

include the tax rate, distance to a central business district, a dummy variable for light
traffic, elevation of property above sea level, slope of property as a percent, natural
log of the distance in feet to nearest industrial zone, nearest commercial zone, and
quality of view as indicated by county assessor (range 0-9, 0 if no view).

Prices are

logged in order to implement least squares regression in estimating the hedonic price
function.
Two models are estimated based on different assumptions.

In model 1,

characteristics of the nearest wetland (size, distance, type) are assumed to affect
property value; while in model 2, the distance to the nearest wetland of each type is
assumed to influence property values.

Their results show that increasing the size of

the nearest wetland by one acre would increase a property's value by $24.39, while
decreasing the distance to the nearest wetland by 1,000 feet would increase a
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property's value by $436.17.

In addition, the type of wetland does not appear to

matter to nearby residents.
Besides the literature that we have discussed above, some other notable examples
of such studies include (but not limited to): Bates and Santerre (2001), Geoghegan
(2002), Provencher et al. (2008), Sander and Polasky (2009), Schulz and Waltert
(2009), and Shultz and King (2001).

While most hedonic studies choose housing

price as the research basis (i.e., the dependent variable in the regression), there are
some studies that choose the value of land as the target variable.

Since the structure

of housing itself is an important factor that affects the housing price, for our study
perhaps the value of raw land is a better basis for evaluating the open-space impact on
property value.

A good example is Cheshire and Sheppard (1995).

Cheshire and Sheppard (1995) estimate the capitalization of the value of the
location-specific characteristics into land prices.

Unlike the conventional approach

which treats urban rent as the price of pure land, they argue that land itself is a
composite good which embodies neighborhood, environmental characteristics and
local public goods.

They use data from Reading and Darlington during a

comparatively stable period in the British housing market. The 1981 Census of
Population is used to provide data of neighborhood characteristics.

They also

measure the accessibility of each house to the bus network as well as roads of
different classes.

They suggest that larger roads may increase the housing value

since they provide better accessibility and more importantly, the possible conversion
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to commercial use.

Accessible land amenity, non-accessible land amenity, percent

of land in accessible open space, and percent of land in inaccessible open space are
recorded in a 1 kilometer square around each structure.
Cheshire and Sheppard (1995) construct a very flexible land rent function, which
uses an exponential form to regress the land rent on distance from town centre and
angle of deflection from East.

They suggest this form because they think it could

allow for multiple radial asymmetries in land rents to emerge via the estimated
parameters. This land rent function is then incorporated into the hedonic model
where the Box-Cox functional form is used. The rental price is regressed on structural
or location-specific characteristics, the quantity of land included with structure, set of
indices of characteristics that are dichotomous, set of indices of characteristics that
are continuously variable and the land rent function.

One distinct feature is that they

include the effect of closely correlated variables within one variable to resolve the
colinearity between characteristics.

They include both the congestible amenities and

structure characteristics since they suggest that, in general they will not be correlated
due to the "neighborhood" nature.

Their findings show that, the rent does not

monotonically decline from the CBD, but it increases in certain directions.
A few authors have found that proximity to public transportation or roads and
highways can have a significant impact on property values. The effect is complex:
good access to such infrastructure can make daily life more convenient, but it may
also be associated with disameneties such as traffic noise and increased crime.
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Gibbons and Machin (2003) evaluate the economic benefits of transport access,
noting both the positive and negative impacts of proximity to a railway line.

They

distinguish between proximity to a railway line and the distance to a station to
separate out environmental and transport access effects. Their research confirms that
benefits of station proximity and high service frequencies are both capitalized in
property prices.

Nelson (1982) also reviews nine studies of the effect of highway

noise, finding that highway noise levels decline to background levels within roughly
1,000 feet of a highway so that the effect on property values is contained to a
relatively small segment of a market.
We now summarize the literature reviewed thus far.

In these studies, open space

has been interpreted very broadly as parks, wetlands, trails, rivers, creeks, or even
unused land, and are normally measured in three ways.

The first method uses only

proximity, which is commonly calculated by the Euclidean distance (in feet or meters)
from the centroid of the property to the nearest edge (or centroid as well) of a feature.
The second method is to use dummy variables to show the existence of a feature
within certain range of the property, e.g., within 100 feet, 1000 meters, and so on.
The third approach is to combine a measure of proximity with a measure of size,
where size of each feature is calculated by acreages or square meters. Other
locational characteristics, such as distance to the central business district or
employment centers in other nearby cities, are also frequently included.

With regard

to the functional form, it appears that the choice of functional forms is simply an
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empirical issue. Normally, linear, semi-log, and log-log functional forms are used
and compared. Sometimes, Box-Cox transformation is also used to derive a more
flexible functional form.

Most studies use a combination of property sales data, GIS

data (on streets and highways, hydrological systems, etc.), and the Census data (on
both ethnic composition and income, etc.), which demonstrates the data requirements
of hedonic studies.

In regard to the valuation, sales price of a residential property is

commonly regressed on structural characteristics, environmental characteristics, open
space characteristics, and other neighborhood characteristic, as well as market
segment variables.
While much of the hedonic literature uses a static approach, some hedonic
studies involve data gathered over time. As Freeman (1993) has proposed, most
environmental goods are time-variant and therefore may be lead to different price
estimates over time.

Riddel (2001) argues that if the time needed for full realization

of amenity value is sufficiently long, then one should incorporate a time trend in the
estimation.

Common approaches to the time issue are to deflate sales price by some

kind of housing price index (for example, Bolitzer and Netusil, 2000; Lutzenhiser and
Netusil, 2001) or the consumer price index (for example, Geoghegan, 2002; Leggett
and Bockstael, 2000). The choice of methods is, once again, an empirical issue.
As deflating by HPI appears to be one of the standard approaches, Diewert et al.
(2010) argue that the housing price index needs to be decomposed into land and
structure components, casting some light on the empirical difficulties of the prevalent
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use of HPI.

In addition, the time-dummy method is also very popular in hedonic

studies (see the discussion by Melser, 2005).

For example, Provencher et al. (2008)

include annual dummy variables to represent the temporal shifts in the residential
property market.
In contrast to the previous studies, which focused on property values for already
developed land, an important extension of Rosen's framework was presented by
Palmquist (1989). Palmquist treats land as a differentiated production input and
assumes that, this differentiated factor (land, in this example) is purchased by a buyer
following a derived demand for the input.

The supply side is similar to the Rosen's

(1974) model, but Palmquist separates the characteristics vector into two parts: in
addition to the usual assumption of exogenously determined characteristics, some
characteristics could be endogenously determined by the buyer. The bid function for
raw land hence arises from the derived demand for existing exogenous characteristics,
as well as those characteristics that can be manipulated.
Traditional hedonic theory is based on two critical assumptions: the competitive
market structure and the matching property prices with the market participants' true
valuations. However, if the market is characterized by a monopolistic seller, then
we do not have a set of offer curves as the traditional hedonic theory predicts.
Instead, we end up with only one offer function which stands alone in the market (see
Fig. 2.1).

In addition, in some special cases such as an English auction setting, the

actual sales price will not represent the market participants' true valuations since
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possible auction premium may exist (see Fig. 2.2).

In these scenarios, we cannot

directly use the observed sales price to estimate the hedonic price function because it
fails to represent the true valuation of the market participants, due to the monopolistic
seller and the incentive incompatibility issue for all the participants in the English
auction.

To our knowledge, no study has been done to examine sales of property

when confronting these two violations to the traditional assumptions of the hedonic
pricing theory.

3. Market Setting and Data
3.1. The Land Market in China
The land market in China provides us with an opportunity to examine the two
violations to traditional hedonic theory mentioned above.

In China, all land is

owned by either the central government or local government, although the precise
entity holding ownership is usually not specified.

The sale of land for development

is in essence a long term lease, with the term varying from 40 to 70 years.

The

maturity for residential use land is 70 years, which is a time period long enough to
have generated an active real estate market for developers and private citizens
seeking housing.

Currently the most popular transaction method for private

development in the "wholesale" land market is an auction.

Two types of auction are

used in the market: a Type 1 auction is held in an auction hall at a particular time,
with the land sale completed later that same day.

In contrast, a Type 2 auction
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Fig. 2.1. A Monopolistic Supplier in the Hedonic Equilibrium
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Fig. 2.2. Possible Bidders' Premium in the Hedonic Equilibrium

publicly posts the current highest bid, but allows bidders to repeatedly submit new
bids over a longer period of time (e.g., two weeks).

In essence, both approaches
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represent an open ascending-bid auction, better known as an English Auction.
In many cities in China, an authority called the "developable land reserve center"
processes land for development.

Land becomes available for development in two

ways. First, the local government can engage in renewal of an aging city center by
paying the original residents to move out, or allocating residents to alternative
(generally larger and newer) housing units; old buildings are then dismantled prior to
selling the land for new development.

Another important source of developable

land is agricultural land located in the suburban regions of a city. Although strict
restrictions govern conversion of agricultural land, the cost of converting agricultural
land into developable land reserve is still much lower than land located in the central
portion of a city. The revenue generated from all such land sales is an important
source of local public financing (at present, there is no property tax in China).1

3.2. The City of Chengdu
The city of Chengdu is the capital city of Sichuan Province which lies in the
southwestern part of mainland China.

It is situated at the western edge of the

Sichuan Basin, about 1500 kilometers southwest of Beijing. With nearly 13 million
official residents, Chengdu is the fourth largest city in China and serves as the most
important economic, transportation and communication hubs in southwestern China.
The most urbanized part of the city consists of 4 concentric ring roads, with a fifth
1 The central government and local government share the land sales revenues.
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ring road under construction.

It is expanding in nearly all directions via planned and

in situ mass transportation modes (a planned subway system and an already
well-developed highway system).

Further, Chengdu is a standard monocentric city

lying in a plain, which frees us from concerns regarding heterogeneity in hypsography.
Chengdu also has very active markets in both developable land and residential
housing but, as an inland city, it is subject to less speculation than the coastal cities.
The natural boundary of the metropolitan area is within the fourth ring road,
composed of about 600 square kilometers, though in some directions urbanization
goes beyond the fourth ring area (see Fig. 2.3).

Areas to the northwest, west, south,

and southeast of the city center have access to high speed, low-congestion roads with
easy access to the main city; they are also rich in natural open space amenities.
Expansion to the west of the city center is strictly restricted due to farm land
protection.

Thus, most future expansion will be to the north, east, and south.

3.3. Data description
We have obtained all government land transaction records from the Bureau of
Land and Resources Chengdu.

The data set consists of 450 observations of land

sales for residential development between January 2004 and October 2009.

Parcel

locations in the official sales record were manually mapped to GIS coordinates; 100
parcels either could not be located with precision or were located outside our study
area and were dropped from the data set, leaving 350 land sales for residential
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Fig. 2.3. Metropolitan Area of Chengdu

development.

Fig. 2.4 shows the locations of the parcels in the data set.

Some 17%

of parcels were located inside the first ring road, 10% between the first and second
ring roads, 34% between the second and third, 18% between the third and fourth; 21%
of parcels were located outside of the fourth ring road.

In addition, we also

distinguish parcels by locations within the eleven administrative districts making up
the study area of Chengdu city. All administrative districts are bisected by more than
two ring roads, allowing us to use these two kinds of variables to capture unobserved
neighborhood effects for any given parcel.
Each transaction record provides information about the transaction date, the type
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Fig. 2.4. Spatial Distribution of Land Sales

of auction governing the transaction, the area of the parcel, the per unit area
transaction price as well as the asking price listed by the local government. Prices are
measured as RMB￥ per square meter.2

Fig. 2.5 shows the spatial distribution of

the unit land transaction price over the study area, both in 3-D and perpendicular
views.

It is easy to discern that the highest land prices lie in the center of the city,

which is consistent with the prediction of a monocentric urban model.

Land parcels

directly south of the city center appear to have a higher price than other parcels

2 The standard "posted" price unit used for land sales in China is ￥10,000
per Chinese acre (roughly 666.667 m2) .
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Fig. 2.5. Distribution of the Log Values of Land Sales Price over the Study Area
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Table 2.1
Descriptive Statistics of Variables in Transaction Record
Mean
4435.430
8220.774
50777.200
87.4%
82.9%
17.1%
4.089
0.325
0.264

2

Asking price (￥/ m )
Sales price (￥/ m2)
Parcel Size (m2)
Single plot (1=yes)
Type 1 Auction (1=yes)
Type 2 Auction (1=yes)
Maximum Plot Ratio
Maximum Structural Ratio
Minimum Green Ratio

Median
3899.998
5999.997
27799.290
---4.000
0.300
0.250

Std. Dev.
3732.432
9582.095
112558.900
0.332
0.377
0.377
1.607
0.085
0.050

located with the same distance from the city center, but that is likely because a future
central business district is currently under construction between the 3rd ring road and
the 4th ring road in the south.
Land offered for sale by the government is frequently accompanied by detailed
development restrictions.

For example, the density of a parcel is restricted by

maximum values for Plot Ratio, the ratio of total floor area (also known as
construction area) to the land parcel area; the Structural Density Ratio, the ratio of the
total base area of the building to the land parcel area.

Structural Density essentially

restricts the footprint of a building, whereas the Plot Ratio limits the overall area of a
multistory building. Finally, another important development restriction is the Green
Ratio, the minimum ratio of the open space area to the land parcel area. The statistics
for these measures are reported in Table 2.1.
We also include five sources of open space amenities and local infrastructure that
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Table 2.2
Descriptive Statistics of Variables in Proximity and Aggregate
Mean

Median

Std. Dev.

1834.374
2015.939
3110.657
1591.718
437.529

1260.185
1172.571
1778.537
1036.565
261.535

1672.456
2318.161
3523.823
1673.176
758.167

0.115
0.111
0.006
0.205
8.908

0.121
0.095
0.006
0.211
9.199

0.039
0.064
0.003
0.048
2.314

Proximity
Park Proximity (m)
Hospital Proximity (m)
Subway Station Proximity (m)
River Proximity (m)
Road Proximity (m)
Aggregate
Park Level
Hospital Level
Subway Station Level
River Level
Road Level

might affect the value of land for residential development. The statistics for these
variables are reported in Table 2.2. Urban amenities may include public parks, or a
view of one of the many rivers flowing through Chengdu.

Infrastructure that might

be important to development decisions include accessibility to highways and the
major roads network in the study area, as well as subway stations planned for the near
future, or hospitals.3

We capture these influences using two different measures: for

some variables, such as a view of the river or distance to the nearest subway station, a
simple proximity measure (distance) may be appropriate. For other variables such
as accessibility to public parks or hospitals, a simple proximity variable might not be
enough to capture the major value associated with accessibility.
3 We include only publicly owned hospitals in Chengdu.

Instead, an
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aggregate variable that captures the scale of amenities or infrastructure (the number
of hectares of a park or beds in a hospital) may prove to be a better measure. To
some extent, the precise measurement being used—proximity or aggregate—is an
empirical matter, so we have calculated both for use in the analysis. Measures of
proximity simply capture the shortest distance to the amenity or infrastructure,
measured in meters using the Haversine Formula.4

All proximity values are logged

to take care of the scale issue (also see for example, Mahan et al., 2000).

For

aggregate measures we use a weighting formula that "discounts" amenities or
infrastructure located further away from the parcel. For example, our aggregate
measure of K public parks associated with a land parcel located at latitude u and
longitude v is,
a(u,v) =

k/zk

(2.1)

where a(u,v) measures the public park aggregate, ak is the size of the kth park in
square meters, and zk is the distance from land parcel to the kth park.

In addition to

public parks, this calculation was also completed for hospitals (ak = beds in the kth
hospital), subway stations (ak = 1 for each station), river locations (ak = 1 for 1500
river locations) and major roads (ak = 1 for 70,826 road locations). The aggregate
measures for subway stations, river locations, and roads are akin to the method used
4 The Haversine formula calculates the distance between any two points on a
sphere. Haversine distance is usually obtained in the following steps: R =
earth's radius (mean= 6,371km), Δlat = lat2 − lat1, Δlong = long2 − long1, a =
sin²(Δlat/2) + cos(lat1) × cos(lat2) × sin²(Δlong/2), c = 2 ×
arcsin{min[1,sqrt(a)]}, d = R × c. All angles are measured in radians.
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by Gibbons and Machin (2003), where we capture not just the positive amenity of
accessibility but also any disamenities that might be associated with crime (subway
stops) or noise (roads).

That is, high values of the aggregate road or subway

measures may either positively or negatively affect parcel values, whereas high
values of the aggregate river measure may be associated with the amenity of being
surrounded on many sides by water.

4. English Auctions
English auctions are known to have an incentive incompatibility problem in that
participants, including the winner, need not reveal their true valuations according to
the auction mechanism.5

In an auction setting, the market involves competition only

on one side: a single seller versus several potential buyers.

For the seller, the

situation is relatively simple. As the seller announces an asking price, its true
valuation can be derived from Riley and Samuelson's (1981) formula based on its
asking price as well as the distribution of the buyer's valuation.6
more complicated for bidders.

The situation is

An English auction is equivalent to Vickrey's second

price sealed auction in the sense that the highest bidder (presumed to be the bidder
with the highest true valuation) wins.

However, in Vickrey's second price sealed

5 In some auction studies, a player's reservation price (or reservation value)
denotes its true valuation; while in others, they are not the same. To avoid
possible confusion, we do not use the term "reservation price" in this study.
6 In some auction studies, the asking price is referred to as the "reserve
price."
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auction, the winner's valuation is known and the winner only pays the second-highest
valuation as the rule requires.

Although in an English auction the winning bid

asymptotically approaches the second-highest valuation, the winner's true valuation
remains unobservable.7

We explore some details in English auction with a focus on

the market participants' true valuations below.
Riley and Samuelson (1981) present a method to derive the optimal asking price
of the seller in an English auction. Their approach is implemented in three steps.

In

the first step, Riley and Samuelson derive the expected revenue of the seller. They
start their derivation from the buyer, and define the buyer's expected gain as the
product of true valuation, v, and probability of winning, minus the expected payment.
For buyer i, its non-cooperative equilibrium bid Θi, is a function of true valuation vi,
hence Θi = Θ(vi).

Consider a particular potential buyer, denoted by "buyer 1," who

bids according to Θ1 = Θ(v). As Milgrom and Weber (1982) have shown that, when
there are least two players to bid in an English auction, the dominant bidding strategy
is Θ(v) = v.8

Assuming that there are np potential bidders (players) in the auction,

buyer 1 wins only when all other

np - 1 buyers bid less than Θ(v).

Let the

7 Empirically, the English auction winner pays the second-highest valuation
plus the last increment in the auction, with the last increment asymptotically
approaching zero.
8 Note that for the winner, even its dominant strategy is to bid according to its
true valuation, the winner does not necessarily need to pay according to its
true valuation. Riley and Samuelson (1981) have similar argument, and they
call such bidding strategy as the "optimal strategy" of the buyers. Therefore, as
a result of the auction (not strategy), Θ(v) = v holds only for the losers in the
auction. This is commonly referred to as "loser tells the truth."
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cumulative distribution function, F(v), show the probability a buyer has a true
valuation less than or equal to v. Given the independently identical distribution (i.i.d)
n 1

assumption, buyer 1 wins with the probability of [ F (v)] p .9

Therefore, buyer 1's

expected gain in the auction is,
n 1

Π(v, v1) = v1 × [ F (v)] p

- P(v)

(2.2)

where P(v) is buyer 1's expected payment.
Buyer 1's optimal choice according to the bidding strategy of Θ(v) is v = v1, thus
at v = v1, the following first order condition must hold:
n 1

 (v, v1 )
d [ F (v)] p
= v1 ×
v
dv

-

P(v)
=0
v

\ (2.3)

Let us now introduce the buyer's threshold valuation regarding the auction object, r,
below which it is not profitable to bid.10 Thus, the following participation constraint
must hold as well:
n 1

Π(r, r) = r × [ F (r )] p

- P(r) = 0

( ( (2.4)

Therefore, for all v1 ≥ r, Eq. (2.3) can be rewritten as,

9 The event "buyer 1 wins" is equivalent to the event "all other np - 1 potential
buyers fail." Note that the probability of a potential buyer, whose valuation is
less than v, is F(v). Then, according to the i.i.d. assumption, the probability of
n 1
"all other np - 1 potential buyers fail" is [ F (v)] p .
10 We call r the threshold valuation by meaning that if the buyer's valuation is
exactly r (v = r), then its expected profit is zero. Then for those buyers whose
valuation is greater than r, they are anticipating some positive level of profit.
However, as the buyer increases its bid in the auction, such expected profit is
gradually consumed. Finally, when the buyer bids at its true valuation (i.e., the
maximum amount it can bid), the expected profit becomes zero again.
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n 1
P(v1 )
d [ F (v1 )] p
= v1 ×
v1
dv1

( (2.5)

Buyer 1's expected payment is obtained by integrating Eq. (2.5) and using Eq. (2.4) as
a boundary condition,
n 1

P(v1) = v1 × [ F (v1 )] p



-

v1

r

[ F (v)]

n p 1

((2.6)

dv

Now, for the seller, both v1 and P(v1) are random variables, but with known
distribution. Hence, the seller's expected revenue from buyer 1 is E[P(v1)], as
follows:
E[P(v1)] =

 {[v 
v

r

dF (v)
n 1
 F (v)  1]  [ F (v)] p }dv
dv

( (2.7)

where v is the maximum value that the random variable v can take, i.e., F( v )=1.11
Since the seller has no private information about the potential buyers beyond the
distribution of their true valuation, the seller uses "equal treatment" regarding all np
buyers, i.e., every buyer might be buyer 1. Therefore, the seller's expected revenue
from buyer 1 is,
np × E[P(v1)] = np ×

 {[v 
v

r

dF (v)
n 1
 F (v)  1]  [ F (v)] p }dv
dv

(|(2.8)

The second step that Riley and Samuelson (1981) implement is to derive the
buyer's equilibrium bidding strategy.

Assume that the seller announces an asking

price, Θ0, which is the minimum amount that the seller would accept in the auction.
Obviously, only those potential buyers who have true valuation v > Θ0 would

11 Note that v is the hypothetical boundary of the distribution F(v), which
predicts the event that "every buyer fails." In another word, there would be no
winner at v = v .
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participate in the auction.

From the buyer's view point, the expected payment is

hence,
P(v) = Prob {the buyer is the winner} × Θ(v)

/(2.9)

Solving Θ(v) from Eq. (2.9) yields the buyer's equilibrium bidding strategy.
The third step that Riley and Samuelson (1981) implement is to derive the seller's
optimal asking price.

In Eq. (2.8), we do not consider the case that the auction fails.

When the true valuations of all buyers are less than r, then no buyers will participate
n

in the auction. The probability of such case is [ F (r )] p . Then, the seller would have
the "gain" of its own true valuation, v0. Thus, we could construct the seller's "total"
expected return, TR, as follows:
n

E[TR] = v0 × [ F (r )] p + np ×

 {[v 
v

r

dF (v)
n 1
 F (v)  1]  [ F (v)] p }dv
dv

((2.10)

Differentiating Eq. (2.10) with respect to r, we obtain the optimal value of the asking
price,
np × [v0 ×

dF (r )
dF (r )
n 1
-r×
- F(r) + 1] × [ F (r )] p = 0
dr
dr

|(2.11)

Rearranging Eq. (2.11), we have:
v0 = r - [1 - F(r)] / f(r)

(2.12)

In Eq. (2.12), F(r) is the cumulative distribution function (CDF), and f(r) is the
probability density function (PDF). Note that the number of potential buyers has been
eliminated. Therefore, to solve for the seller's true valuation v0, we only need
information about the distribution of the buyer's valuation as well as the asking price
announced by the seller.
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The true valuation held by the winner is a bit more complicated to obtain.
Based on Riley and Samuelson's (1981) study, we use three steps to derive the
winner's true valuation.

The first step is to link the true valuation of the winner and

the second-highest bidder.

We denote the true valuations of the winner and the

second-highest bidder by v1 and v2, respectively. Since Eq. (2.6) holds for every
potential buyer in the auction, we have:
n 1

P(v2) = v2 × [ F (v2 )] p

-



v2

r

[ F (v)]

n p 1

|(2.13)

dv

Similarly to Eq. (2.9), we can write the second-highest bidder's expected payment as,
P(v2) = Prob {the buyer is the second-highest bidder} × Θ(v2)

|(2.14)

Then, what is the probability of a buyer being the second-highest bidder? We
now divide all potential buyers into three groups: the winner, the second-highest
bidder, and other buyers. All other buyers have their true valuations less than v2, with
n 2

probability [ F (v2 )] p . In addition, the winner wins only when the second-highest
bidder's true valuation is less than v1. This is given by probability F(v1). Therefore,
the total probability can be expressed as follows:
n 2

Prob {the buyer is the second-highest bidder} = [ F (v2 )] p

× F(v1)

|(2.15)

Combining Eqs. (2.13) to (2.15), we have:
n 1

v2 × [ F (v2 )] p

-



v2

r

[ F (v)]

n p 1

n 2

dv = [ F (v2 )] p

× F(v1) × Θ(v2)

Since "loser tells the truth," we have: Θ(v2) = v2. Therefore, Eq. (2.16) can be
rewritten as:

(2.16)
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n 1

v2 × [ F (v2 )] p
The term



v2

r

-

[ F (v)]



n p 1

v2

r

[ F (v)]

n p 1

n 2

dv = [ F (v2 )] p

× F(v1) × v2

(|(2.17)

dv cannot be directly integrated. However, according to the

Fundamental theorem of calculus, we have:
v2

n 1
{  [ F (v)]n p 1dv } = [ F (v2 )] p
v 2 r

|(2.18)

Thus, we differentiate both sides of Eq. (2.17) with respect to v2, after rearrangement,
we obtain the link between true valuations of the winner and the second-highest
bidder, as follows:
F(v2) × F(v1) + v2 × (np - 2) × f(v2) × F(v1) = v2 × (np - 1) × F(v2) × f(v2)
|
Eq. (2.19) in fact shows the probability relationship between v1 and v2.

(2.19)
The

English auction winner pays the second-highest valuation plus the last increment in
the auction. However, the increment in the auction is usually very small. Hence, in an
English auction the winning bid asymptotically approaches the second-highest
valuation. Denoting the actual sales price (winning bid) by s, we have v2 ≈ s.
After obtaining the second-highest valuation v2, the number of potential buyers np is
yet unknown. Therefore, our second step to uncover v1 is to find np.
As Paarsch (1997) has pointed out, a measure of potential competition in the
auction is notoriously difficult, and often impossible. With the knowledge of the
"actual bidders," whose true valuations are no less than the asking price proposed by
the seller, Paarsch uses a conditional relationship to map out the potential competition
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upon the number of actual bidders. However, we do not have such information
about the actual bidders. Recall that in Eq. (2.8), we have presented the expected
revenue to the seller when the auction is successful.

In real world, the seller gets the

actual sales price (winning bid) as the result of a successful auction. Therefore, we
have:
np ×

 {[v 
v

r

dF (v)
n 1
 F (v)  1]  [ F (v)] p }dv = s
dv

|(2.20)

Solving np from Eq. (2.20),12 we obtain a measure of potential competition (note that
v is solved from F( v )=1).

The third step we need to reveal v1 is to derive the distribution of the buyer's
valuation, F(v) and f(v).

Paarsch proposes a method to use the bonus bid (auction

premium) to empirically estimate the distribution of the buyer's valuation. Paarsch
defines the bonus bid b, as:
b=s−r ≥ 0

| (2.21)

where s is the actual sales price (winning bid) and r is the seller's asking price.
Obviously, the bonus bid, b, is a variable with a non-negative value. Paarsch has
proposed a conditional maximum likelihood estimator to estimate the distribution of
the buyer's valuation based on the number of the actual bidders in the auction.

In

our study, we follow Paarsch's basic idea to derive the distribution of the auction
dF (v)
n 1
 F (v)  1]  [ F (v)] p is highly non-linear,
dv
which makes it impossible to directly conduct the integration. Hence, we
conduct the first-order Taylor expansion to linearize the integrand before we
do the integration.

12 Note that the integrand [v 
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premium and, thus, an estimate of the winner's true valuation v1. The exact method
is presented in a later section of this paper.13

5. Empirical Models
Before presenting our models it is necessary to address a number of empirical
issues. First, a common econometric problem in hedonic modeling is that the data
are related to one another in a spatially heterogeneous manner.

Anselin (1988) uses

"spatial dependence" or "spatial correlation" to denote the case in which the value
observed in one location depends on the values at neighboring locations.

The spatial

correlation problem can be addressed using either a spatial-lag model or spatial-error
model, the two most common spatial econometric models (each with many variants).
In our study, we only focus on the Spatial Autoregressive Model (SAR) and the
Spatial Error Model (SEM).

The form of the SAR model is,

y = ρ × W ×y + X ×β + e

\(2.22)

whereas the functional form of the SEM is given by,
y = X × β + u, u = λ × W × u + e

|(2.23)

In the Eqs. (2.22) and (2.23), X and y are standard explanatory and dependent
variables. W is referred to as the spatial weight matrix; ρ and λ are the spatial lag
coefficients in both SAR and SEM, respectively. The disturbance term e is assumed to

13 For more related studies, see Cremer and McLean (1988), Levin and Smith
(1994), Levin and Smith (1996), and McAfee and Reny (1992).
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be a Normal distribution, N(0, σ2).
For the SAR, ρ is a coefficient on the spatially lagged dependent variable, W × y.
To show the OLS properties of SAR, we transform Eq. (2.22) as follows:
y = (I - ρ × W)-1 × X × β + (I - ρ × W)-1 × e

(2.22a)

Therefore, the OLS estimator for β is,

-1
 = (XL' × XL) × XL' × y

where, XL = (I - ρ × W)-1 × X.

((2.22b)

Substituting Eq. (2.22a) into Eq. (2.22b) and expand

all the terms, we have:

-1
-1
-1
 = (XL' × XL) × XL' × XL × β + (XL' × XL) × XL' × (I - ρ × W) × e

|(2.22c)


By inspection, from Eq. (2.22c) we have: E[  ] = β, which means that the OLS
estimates of β for the SAR is still unbiased.

However, Anselin (1988) has shown

that the OLS estimate for ρ is biased. To show this, Anselin (1988) proposes a simple
model, which he calls "The first-order spatial AR model," as follows:
y = ρ × W ×y + e

((2.22d)

The estimator of ρ is hence,
̂ = (yL' × yL)-1 × yL' × y = ρ + (yL' × yL)-1 × yL' × e

where yL = W × y.

|(2.22e)

According to Anselin's explanation, W × y is not fixed in

repeated sampling (which is the traditional requirement for the explanatory variables),
since the observations are generated by a spatial process.
expectation operator over the term (yL' × yL)-1 × yL'.

Hence, we cannot pass the

Therefore, we know that E[ ̂ ]
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≠ ρ, and the estimator of ρ is biased.

In addition, Anselin (1988) also proposes that

the probability limit (plim) of the term yL' × e, which can be expressed as,
1
1
× (yL' × e) = plim × {e' × [(I - ρ × W)-1]' × W' × e}
n
n

plim

((2.22f)

will not equal zero for all non-trivial case of ρ ≠ 0. Therefore, the estimator of ρ is
inconsistent.
A more interesting feature than the inconsistency of ρ is the change of β's
variance - covariance matrix. By inspection of Eq. (2.22c), we can see that the


variance - covariance of  depends on the term (XL' × XL)-1 × XL' × (I - ρ × W)-1 × e.
Thus, we have:


Var[  |X] = σ2 × (XL' × XL)-1 × XL' × (I - ρ × W)-1 × [(I - ρ × W)-1]'
× XL × [(XL' × XL)-1]'

(|(2.22g)


Apparently, only in the trivial case of ρ = 0, can Var[  |X] be reduced to σ2 × (X' ×


X)-1. Therefore, Var[  |X] is not consistent. As a result of this inefficiency issue, the t


statistics of  will be underestimated.
In regard to the SEM, from Eq. (2.23) the OLS estimator for β is,

-1
-1
-1
 = (X' × X) × X' × y = (X' × X) × X' × [X × β + (I - λ × W) × e]

= (X' × X)-1 × X' × X × β + (X' × X)-1 × X' × (I - λ × W)-1 × e
= β + (X' × X)-1 × X' × (I - λ × W)-1 × e

|(2.23a)

Since the term (X' × X)-1 × X' × (I - λ × W)-1 × e, when taking expectation, would be


zero, we have: E[  ] = β, which means that the OLS estimates of β for the SEM is
still unbiased. However, the probability limit of the term (X' × X)-1 × X' × (I - λ ×
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W)-1 × e,
1
× {(X' × X)-1 × X' × (I - λ × W)-1 × e}
n
1
1
= plim × [(X' × X)-1] × plim × {X' × (I - λ × W)-1 × e}
n
n

plim

|(2.23b)

will not equal zero for all non-trivial case of λ ≠ 0. Therefore, the estimator of λ is
inconsistent. Similar to Eq. (2.22g), we have:


Var[  |X] = σ2 × (X' × X)-1 × X' × (I - λ × W)-1 × [(I - λ × W)-1]'
× X × [(X' × X)-1]'

|(2.23c)


Again, only in the trivial case of λ = 0, can Var[  |X] be reduced to σ2 × (X' × X)-1.




Therefore, Var[  |X] is not consistent, and the t statistics of  will be
underestimated.
While the generalized method of moments (GMM) is sometimes used to estimate
spatial models, the most popular way is to use maximum likelihood estimation (MLE).
In our study, we only present the results of MLE for the spatial models.
When the parcels in a hedonic data set are not contiguous, the spatial weight
matrix is generally formed with element i, j as the inverse distance between parcels i
and j (the elements in each row are normalized such that their summation equals one).
Generally speaking, the combination of spatial techniques with hedonic pricing
models would increase the R2 as well as the significance of estimated coefficients in
the regression (for example, see Kim et al., 2003).
Another issue is how to deal with the passage of time. Our data run from 2004
through 2009, a time of fluctuating land prices in China.

In our study, we consider
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three approaches: deflation only by a HPI, use of only monthly time dummy variables,
as well as a mix of these two approaches.

First, we deflate both the asking price and

winning bid price by a local monthly housing price index.14

Our second approach is

to include a monthly time trend variable, starting with January 2004 equal to one and
ending with October 2009 equal to 70.
previous two approaches.

Our third approach is to use a mix of the

We present and compare the estimation results using each

of these approaches later in the paper.

5.1. From Auction Premium to the Land Seller's True Valuation
Traditional hedonic theory posits that the hedonic equilibrium arises from the
interactions of sellers' offer functions and buyers' bid functions.

Identification

problems usually prevent one from estimating either the offer function or the bid
function of market participants.

In our case, though, there is only one supplier in the

land wholesale market offering land in an English auction; we do not have a set of
offer curves coming from different sellers.

Thus, the posted asking prices of the

monopoly supplier for different plots of land can be used to map out the offer curve
as the characteristics of these plots differ.
We start our analysis by following Paarsch's (1997) approach and calculate the
auction premium (or bonus bid), b, the difference between the actual sales price and

14 This housing price index of Chengdu is reported monthly by an authority
called the National Development and Reform Commission.
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Fig. 2.6. Empirical Distribution of the Deflated Auction Premium, b

the asking price. The empirical distribution of deflated b is shown in Fig. 2.6 (where
the large spike at the left includes both zero and many small non-zero values).
There one may note that the empirical distribution of the auction premium follows a
left-censored Normal distribution, suggesting the use of the Tobit model for its
estimation.

Note that, of our 350 observations of the auction premium, some 57 are

equal to zero.
Paarsch's (1997) method begins with the relationship between the sales price s,
the asking price r, and the bid premium b, as Eq. (2.21) has shown. We let v be the
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per unit raw profit of housing development net of expenditure on the land purchase.
In addition, we assume that H(L) is the quantity of housing arising from parcel
development, PH is the per unit housing price, and C(L) is the cost of development,
where L is the quantity of developable land as an input. Then the profit associated
with the land input is,
v × L = PH × H(L) − C(L)

| (2.24)

Now we introduce the expenditure for land purchase, so the profit of the
development, Π, is,
Π = PH × H(L) − C(L) − s × L = PH × H(L) − C(L) − (r + b) × L

|(2.25)

Setting Π= Π*, where Π* is the desired profit level, we have:
b = [PH × H(L) − C(L) − r × L − Π*] / L = [v × L − r × L − Π*] / L
= v – r − Π*/L

((2.26)

When Π* = 0, other things equal, b achieves its maximum value, the highest bid the
developer would make.15

If we were to use a Tobit model to parameterize b

according to b = βX + e, one could use the error distribution to recover the
distribution of v, which is the true valuation of the land to the developer.
We do so by noting that e is assumed to be an i.i.d. random variable normally
distributed as N(0,σ2).

Let βTobit and σTobit be the estimation results from Tobit

regression of b on the explanatory variables X, so the pdf of e, fe(e), could be denoted

15 Note that Π* ≥ 0.
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as N(0, σTobit 2).16

By the inverse function of e, e = b − βTobitX, we can derive the pdf

of b by the simple probability transformation, fb(b) = fe(b − βTobitX).17

Noting that

b = v − u, we could get the pdf of v by an equivalent probability transformation in a
similar manner,
fv(v) = fb(v − u) = fe(v – u − βTobitX)

|(2.27)

Once we have the pdf of the buyer's true valuation fv(v), we can obtain the
corresponding cdf, Fv(v), by integrating fv(v). Then, along with the data of the asking
price proposed by the seller, we can calculate the seller's true valuation v0 from Eq.
(2.12). As soon as we have the information of v0, we can conduct the hedonic
estimation for the seller.

All models were estimated using OLS, SAR, and SEM

techniques. We do not go details of the tests for spatial correlation, but three out of
five spatial tests suggest that there is strong spatial dependence / correlation for the
seller's true valuation, and hence we report results from our SEM model.18,19
Our best results—on the basis on expected coefficient signs, the spatial
correlation tests, and best fit—were obtained with semi-log specification using a
16 The estimation results of the Tobit model are listed in Tables 2.3, 2.4,and
2.5 for the cases using only HPI deflation, only monthly dummy, and a mix of
the two, respectively. Since the Tobit model estimation is just an
intermediate step in this section, we do not discuss its results in detail.
17 Note that fb(b) = fe(b − βTobitX) × |de / db|, and de / db = 1.
18 We used test statistics for Moran's I-test, a likelihood ratio test, a Wald test,
and a Lagrange multiplier test for spatial correlation in the residuals, and a
Lagrange multiplier test for correlation in the SAR residuals. See Anselin
(1988) and LeSage (1999) for details.
19 In our study, SEM does a better job than SAR estimation in terms of
higher t statistic values, R2 value, and log-likelihood value, as well as "correct"
signs of the estimated coefficients which are consistent with our expectation.
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Table 2.3
Tobit Estimation of Auction Premium, b (￥/ m2), Using HPI Deflation
Variable
Intercept

Coefficient
12369.698

t-statistic
0.811

p-value
0.418

1498.475
53.184
-4796.245
-43140.535

1.555
0.230
-1.124
-5.516

0.121
0.818
0.262
0.000

9.755
189.119
-758.981
-316.350
115.937

0.015
0.545
-1.261
-0.020
0.228

0.988
0.586
0.208
0.984
0.820

-1136.545
-607.044
-1734.941
-881.698
-1294.057
-1062.407
-3145.153
-2813.957
-2265.588
-1604.958
1104.739
-788.132
309.609
988.627

-0.981
-0.528
-1.640
-0.750
-1.020
-0.388
-1.637
-1.390
-1.061
-0.745
0.560
-0.585
0.296
0.555

0.327
0.598
0.102
0.454
0.309
0.698
0.103
0.166
0.289
0.457
0.577
0.559
0.767
0.579

-2194.550
576.185

-2.760
1.762

0.006
0.079

Development Restrictions
Single plot (1=yes)
Maximum Plot Ratio
Maximum Structural Ratio
Minimum Green Ratio
Public Amenities and Infrastructure
ln(Subway Station Proximity)
ln(River Proximity)
ln(Park Proximity)
Hospital Aggregate
Road Aggregate

District and Ring Road Dummy Variables
Jin Niu
QingYang
Cheng Hua
Wu Hou
Gao Xin South
Gao Xin West
Long Quan
Pi County
Shuang Liu County
Xin Du
Within 1st Ring
Between 1st and 2nd Ring
Between 3rd and 4th Ring
Outside 4th Ring
Other Variables
Type2Auction (1=yes)
ln(Parcel Size)

Dependent variable: Deflated Auction Premium
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Table 2.4
Tobit Estimation of Auction Premium, b (￥/ m2), Using Monthly Time Dummy
Variable
Intercept

Coefficient
8252.940

t-statistic p-value
0.766
0.444

Development Restrictions
Single plot (1=yes)
Maximum Plot Ratio
Maximum Structural Ratio
Minimum Green Ratio

1972.591
-186.425
-2083.821
-45830.917

1.677
-0.630
-0.386
-4.272

0.094
0.529
0.701
0.000

155.813
275.323
-1044.481
2996.909
270.746

0.267
0.666
-1.539
0.148
0.583

0.790
0.506
0.125
0.882
0.560

-1719.465
-1383.771
-2079.755
-1674.506
-1663.596
-2504.278
-2884.502
-3417.104
-1704.494
-4662.520
2235.057
-911.437
229.441
718.931

-1.187
-0.920
-1.504
-1.150
-1.009
-0.723
-1.173
-1.376
-0.607
-1.613
0.878
-0.546
0.171
0.314

0.236
0.358
0.134
0.251
0.314
0.470
0.242
0.170
0.545
0.108
0.381
0.586
0.864
0.754

-2956.123
752.266
75.201

-2.836
1.964
2.982

0.005
0.050
0.003

Public Amenities and Infrastructure
ln(Subway Station Proximity)
ln(River Proximity)
ln(Park Proximity)
Hospital Aggregate
Road Aggregate

District and Ring Road Dummy Variables
Jin Niu
QingYang
Cheng Hua
Wu Hou
Gao Xin South
Gao Xin West
Long Quan
Pi County
Shuang Liu County
Xin Du
Within 1st Ring
Between 1st and 2nd Ring
Between 3rd and 4th Ring
Outside 4th Ring
Other Variables
Type2Auction (1=yes)
ln(Parcel Size)
Time Trend
Dependent variable: Auction Premium
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Table 2.5
Tobit Estimation of Auction Premium, b (￥/ m2), Using Both HPI Deflation and
Monthly Dummy
Variable
Intercept

Coefficient
6568.799

t-statistic
0.798

p-value
0.425

1550.168
-93.615
-1436.690
-34189.700

1.744
-0.419
-0.351
-4.224

0.082
0.675
0.726
0.000

103.014
182.405
-800.054
2137.599
211.512

0.232
0.584
-1.562
0.140
0.601

0.817
0.560
0.119
0.889
0.548

-1354.730
-1049.460
-1639.060
-1275.920
-1156.830
-1833.970
-2239.700
-2575.810
-1330.000
-3307.300
1728.213
-713.114
140.318
516.191

-1.238
-0.925
-1.570
-1.161
-0.929
-0.701
-1.207
-1.373
-0.627
-1.517
0.899
-0.566
0.139
0.299

0.216
0.356
0.117
0.246
0.353
0.484
0.228
0.171
0.531
0.130
0.369
0.572
0.890
0.765

-2376.940
531.855
58.695

-3.020
1.837
3.093

0.003
0.067
0.002

Development Restrictions
Single plot (1=yes)
Maximum Plot Ratio
Maximum Structural Ratio
Minimum Green Ratio
Public Amenities and Infrastructure
ln(Subway Station Proximity)
ln(River Proximity)
ln(Park Proximity)
Hospital Aggregate
Road Aggregate

District and Ring Road Dummy Variables
Jin Niu
QingYang
Cheng Hua
Wu Hou
Gao Xin South
Gao Xin West
Long Quan
Pi County
Shuang Liu County
Xin Du
Within 1st Ring
Between 1st and 2nd Ring
Between 3rd and 4th Ring
Outside 4th Ring
Other Variables
Type2Auction (1=yes)
ln(Parcel Size)
Time Trend

Dependent variable: Deflated Auction Premium
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combination of proximity and aggregate measures for public good amenities and
infrastructure.

Estimation results are shown in Tables 2.6, 2.7 and 2.8 for the three

cases regarding different time approaches. The one with HPI deflation (Table 2.6)
has the smallest R2 and log likelihood value. In addition, some of the coefficients'
signs are not consistent with our expectation.

The models using monthly time

dummy (Table 2.7) and both deflation and dummy (Table 2.8) have roughly similar
results. However, since some of the key variables in the mixed case have slightly
larger t-values, and the value of log likelihood is also larger, we consider the one
using a mix of deflation and dummy to be the best model specification.
Using the logarithm of the seller's derived true valuation v0 as the dependent
variable, we find that the only development restriction that the seller takes into
account is the maximum Plot Ratio (total floor area relative to parcel size): as the
maximum Plot Ratio increases its derived true valuation increases. The seller also
notes the value of proximity to a planned subway station in that the true valuation
falls as the plot gets further away. Another infrastructure measure that affects the
true valuation is the aggregate measure of hospitals. That is, as the number of
hospital beds, inversely weighted by distance to the hospital, increases, the seller's
true valuation increases.

In addition, seven of the ten district variables were

statistically significant, indicating that location within the city does affect the seller's
true valuation for the parcel, and the neighborhood effects exist to some degree.
Relative to the baseline location between the second and third ring roads, from the
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Table 2.6
Spatial Error Model of Seller's Derived True Valuation, v0* (￥/ m2), Using HPI
Deflation
Variable
Coefficient
Intercept
8.8149
Development Restrictions
Single plot (1=yes)
-0.0170
Maximum Plot Ratio
0.09246
Maximum Structural Ratio
-1.1689
Minimum Green Ratio
-2.0975
Public Amenities and Infrastructure
ln(Subway Station Proximity)
-0.10238
ln(River Proximity)
-0.0111
ln(Park Proximity)
0.03827
Hospital Aggregate
3.7053
Road Aggregate
-0.00088

t-statistic
13.6207

p-value
0.000

-0.24346
5.2577
-3.6626
-3.41086

0.80764
0.000
0.00025
0.00064

-2.84222
-0.42128
0.88762
2.91580
-0.03019

0.00448
0.67354
0.374744
0.00354
0.97590

-0.1072
0.11064
-0.1976
0.16196
-0.0587
-0.26347
-0.8123
-0.73076
-1.1720
-0.3698
-0.09579
0.13659
-0.0052
0.06927

-1.12512
1.12379
-2.2023
1.72759
-0.53766
-1.2110
-5.2328
-4.4840
-6.6398
-2.1356
-0.6071
1.32154
-0.06203
0.47382

0.26053
0.2610
0.02763
0.0840
0.5908
0.225873
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.03270
0.5437
0.18632
0.9505
0.63562

-0.1124
0.05349

-1.8569
2.2721

0.0633
0.0230

0.4000

1.7166

0.0860

District and Ring Road Dummy Variables
Jin Niu
QingYang
Cheng Hua
Wu Hou
Gao Xin South
Gao Xin West
Long Quan
Pi County
Shuang Liu County
Xin Du
Within 1st Ring
Between 1st and 2nd Ring
Between 3rd and 4th Ring
Outside 4th Ring
Other Variables
Type2Auction (1=yes)
ln(Parcel Size)
λ
Adjusted R-square
sigma^2
log-likelihood
Dependent variable: ln(v0*)

0.6732
0.1492
-42.97258
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Table 2.7
Spatial Error Model of Seller's Derived True Valuation, v0* (￥/ m2), Using
Monthly Time Dummy
Variable
Coefficient
Intercept
7.244
Development Restrictions
Single plot (1=yes)
0.009
Maximum Plot Ratio
0.056
Maximum Structural Ratio
-0.322
Minimum Green Ratio
0.107
Public Amenities and Infrastructure
ln(Subway Station Proximity)
-0.075
ln(River Proximity)
-0.009
ln(Park Proximity)
0.032
Hospital Aggregate
4.505
Road Aggregate
0.023
District and Ring Road Dummy Variables
Jin Niu
-0.169
QingYang
-0.005
Cheng Hua
-0.177
Wu Hou
0.055
Gao Xin South
-0.030
Gao Xin West
-0.455
Long Quan
-0.559
Pi County
-0.662
Shuang Liu County
-0.913
Xin Du
-0.851
st
Within 1 Ring
0.059
st
nd
Between 1 and 2 Ring
0.162
rd
th
Between 3 and 4 Ring
-0.045
th
Outside 4 Ring
-0.066
Other Variables
Type2Auction (1=yes)
-0.168
ln(Parcel Size)
0.044
Time Trend
0.021
λ
Adjusted R-square
sigma^2
log-likelihood
Dependent variable: ln(v0*)

0.592

t-statistic
13.024

p-value
0.000

0.157
3.786
-1.185
0.201

0.875
0.000
0.236
0.841

-2.478
-0.390
0.874
4.229
0.920

0.013
0.697
0.382
0.000
0.358

-2.059
-0.064
-2.314
0.695
-0.323
-2.477
-4.192
-4.773
-6.130
-5.660
0.444
1.883
-0.637
-0.534

0.040
0.949
0.021
0.487
0.747
0.013
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.657
0.060
0.524
0.593

-3.376
2.267
16.339

0.001
0.023
0.000

3.132

0.002

0.794
0.101
25.000
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Table 2.8
Spatial Error Model of Seller's Derived True Valuation, v0* (￥/ m2), Using Both
HPI Deflation and Monthly Dummy
Variable
Coefficient
Intercept
7.271
Development Restrictions
Single plot (1=yes)
-0.000
Maximum Plot Ratio
0.053
Maximum Structural Ratio
-0.283
Minimum Green Ratio
0.161
Public Amenities and Infrastructure
ln(Subway Station Proximity)
-0.081
ln(River Proximity)
-0.010
ln(Park Proximity)
0.032
Hospital Aggregate
4.429
Road Aggregate
0.021
District and Ring Road Dummy Variables
Jin Niu
-0.162
QingYang
0.002
Cheng Hua
-0.176
Wu Hou
0.058
Gao Xin South
-0.017
Gao Xin West
-0.448
Long Quan
-0.555
Pi County
-0.661
Shuang Liu County
-0.906
Xin Du
-0.792
st
Within 1 Ring
0.047
st
nd
Between 1 and 2 Ring
0.155
rd
th
Between 3 and 4 Ring
-0.052
th
Outside 4 Ring
-0.073
Other Variables
Type2Auction (1=yes)
-0.152
ln(Parcel Size)
0.043
Time Trend
0.016
λ
Adjusted R-square
sigma^2
log-likelihood
Dependent variable: ln(v0*)

0.600

t-statistic
13.490

p-value
0.000

-0.002
3.687
-1.077
0.311

0.998
0.000
0.281
0.756

-2.734
-0.458
0.920
4.292
0.877

0.006
0.647
0.357
0.000
0.381

-2.037
0.030
-2.383
0.745
-0.191
-2.518
-4.289
-4.910
-6.275
-5.434
0.366
1.858
-0.759
-0.603

0.042
0.976
0.017
0.457
0.848
0.012
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.715
0.063
0.448
0.546

-3.160
2.312
12.914

0.002
0.021
0.000

3.212

0.001

0.788
0.095
36.229
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seller's perspective only a location between the first and second ring roads has a
premium associated with it.

In addition, when the government offers land in a Type

2 auction, its true valuation falls. As the parcel size increases the seller's true
valuation increases, too. Even after adjusting for the housing price index, the
government’s true valuation has tended to increase with time. Finally, the statistical
significance of λ suggests spatial correlation in the data.

5.2. The Winner's True Valuation
Having estimated the elements of the government's offer function for developable
land, it is now time to turn to the buyer's (developer's) side. As we have noted, the
winning bid does not necessarily reveal the true valuation held by developer.
Following the three steps to derive the winner's true valuation v1 as described in
section 4, we now have all the information we need.

We then use the buyer's

derived true valuation v1 to estimate the bid function of developers.

Tests for spatial

correlation show that one of the five spatial tests suggests spatial dependence; we
therefore use SEM estimation which performs better than SAR estimates. The
estimation results appear in Tables 2.9, 2.10, and 2.11, for the cases using HPI
deflation, monthly time dummy, and a mix of the two, respectively.

The model with

the HPI deflation performs worst, in the sense that it has the smallest R2 and
log-likelihood value, and its estimates of the five environmental and infrastructure
variables are not statistically significant.

The estimation results of the monthly time
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dummy variable model and the model with the mix of HPI deflation and the monthly
dummy are roughly similar. Although the monthly time dummy variable model
(Table 2.10) has the largest R2 value, the t-values are less significant for some of the
key variables than the mixed model. Therefore, we choose the model with the mix
of HPI deflation and the monthly dummy as the best model specification (Table 2.11).
Using the logarithm of the land buyers' derived true valuation as the dependent
variable, we find that development restrictions have a greater impact on buyers'
valuation than those on the government's valuation. All else equal, developers value
the land higher if the land parcel is a single plot.

In addition, as the maximum Plot

Ratio (total floor area relative to parcel size) increases, the buyers' valuations increase.
As the maximum Structural Ratio (footprint area relative to parcel size) falls, buyers'
valuations increase. Also, as the minimum Green Ratio increases, the value of land
for development falls.

Developers also value public amenities and infrastructure a

little differently from the government.

In contrast to the government, which appears

to have to respond to hospital beds and planned subway infrastructure, developers
place value on hospital beds and existing road infrastructure.

The greater the

aggregate service levels of healthcare and roads, the greater the value for
development.

There appears to be a strong correlation between how the government

values various districts and the developers value land in those districts: of the seven
negative and significant district variables in the government's offer function,
developers had similar sign and significance for all seven districts.
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Table 2.9
Spatial Error Model of Buyer's Derived True Valuation, v1* (￥/ m2), Using HPI
Deflation
Variable
Intercept
Development Restrictions
Single plot (1=yes)
Maximum Plot Ratio
Maximum Structural Ratio
Minimum Green Ratio

Coefficient
9.477

t-statistic
10.698

p-value
0.000

0.116
0.132
-2.178
-4.854

1.217
5.497
-5.013
-5.802

0.224
0.000
0.000
0.000

-0.080
-0.016
0.004
2.670
0.045

-1.613
-0.441
0.071
1.536
1.132

0.107
0.659
0.944
0.125
0.257

-0.206
0.068
-0.371
0.101
-0.048
-0.198
-1.109
-0.758
-1.204
-0.663
-0.095
0.011
0.032
0.062

-1.564
0.505
-3.008
0.787
-0.318
-0.665
-5.195
-3.382
-4.984
-2.791
-0.442
0.080
0.277
0.311

0.118
0.614
0.003
0.431
0.750
0.506
0.000
0.001
0.000
0.005
0.658
0.936
0.782
0.756

-0.536
0.058
0.457

-6.502
1.795
2.061

0.000
0.000
0.039

Public Amenities and Infrastructure
ln(Subway Station Proximity)
ln(River Proximity)
ln(Park Proximity)
Hospital Aggregate
Road Aggregate

District and Ring Road Dummy Variables
Jin Niu
QingYang
Cheng Hua
Wu Hou
Gao Xin South
Gao Xin West
Long Quan
Pi County
Shuang Liu County
Xin Du
Within 1st Ring
Between 1st and 2nd Ring
Between 3rd and 4th Ring
Outside 4th Ring
Other Variables
Type2Auction (1=yes)
ln(Parcel Size)
λ
Adjusted R-square
sigma^2
log-likelihood
Dependent Variable: ln(v1*)

0.651
0.276
-150.943
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Table 2.10
Spatial Error Model of Buyer's Derived True Valuation, v1* (￥/ m2), Using
Monthly Time Dummy
Variable
Coefficient
Intercept
7.420
Development Restrictions
Single plot (1=yes)
0.146
Maximum Plot Ratio
0.079
Maximum Structural Ratio
-1.084
Minimum Green Ratio
-1.946
Public Amenities and Infrastructure
ln(Subway Station Proximity)
-0.040
ln(River Proximity)
-0.012
ln(Park Proximity)
-0.012
Hospital Aggregate
3.614
Road Aggregate
0.077
District and Ring Road Dummy Variables
Jin Niu
-0.287
QingYang
-0.096
Cheng Hua
-0.335
Wu Hou
-0.048
Gao Xin South
-0.014
Gao Xin West
-0.485
Long Quan
-0.811
Pi County
-0.690
Shuang Liu County
-0.892
Xin Du
-1.335
st
Within 1 Ring
0.112
st
nd
Between 1 and 2 Ring
0.046
rd
th
Between 3 and 4 Ring
-0.025
th
Outside 4 Ring
-0.089

t-statistic p-value
9.434
0.000
1.749
3.698
-2.763
-2.508

0.080
0.000
0.006
0.012

-0.942
-0.378
-0.227
2.395
2.214

0.346
0.705
0.820
0.017
0.027

-2.541
-0.824
-3.157
-0.428
-0.106
-1.874
-4.371
-3.576
-4.226
-6.316
0.594
0.380
-0.243
-0.514

0.011
0.410
0.002
0.668
0.915
0.061
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.553
0.704
0.808
0.607

-8.346
1.646
14.366
1.562

0.000
0.100
0.000
0.118

Other Variables
Type2Auction (1=yes)
ln(Parcel Size)
Time Trend
λ
Adjusted R-square
sigma^2
log-likelihood
Dependent Variable: ln(v1*)

-0.602
0.046
0.026
0.372

0.752
0.211
-103.412
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Table 2.11
Spatial Error Model of Buyer's Derived True Valuation, v1* (￥/ m2), Using Both
HPI Deflation and Monthly Dummy
Variable
Coefficient
Intercept
7.439
Development Restrictions
Single plot (1=yes)
0.150
Maximum Plot Ratio
0.077
Maximum Structural Ratio
-1.025
Minimum Green Ratio
-1.893
Public Amenities and Infrastructure
ln(Subway Station Proximity)
-0.044
ln(River Proximity)
-0.015
ln(Park Proximity)
-0.011
Hospital Aggregate
3.553
Road Aggregate
0.076
District and Ring Road Dummy Variables
Jin Niu
-0.282
QingYang
-0.089
Cheng Hua
-0.340
Wu Hou
-0.048
Gao Xin South
0.002
Gao Xin West
-0.477
Long Quan
-0.812
Pi County
-0.693
Shuang Liu County
-0.893
Xin Du
-1.263
st
Within 1 Ring
0.114
st
nd
Between 1 and 2 Ring
0.039
rd
th
Between 3 and 4 Ring
-0.034
th
Outside 4 Ring
-0.095

t-statistic
9.760

p-value
0.000

1.856
3.708
-2.700
-2.520

0.063
0.000
0.007
0.012

-1.070
-0.497
-0.222
2.430
2.272

0.285
0.619
0.824
0.015
0.023

-2.576
-0.787
-3.301
-0.446
0.013
-1.900
-4.511
-3.704
-4.363
-6.164
0.624
0.331
-0.346
-0.562

0.010
0.431
0.001
0.656
0.989
0.057
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.533
0.740
0.729
0.574

-8.527
1.678
11.930
1.627

0.000
0.093
0.000
0.104

Other Variables
Type2Auction (1=yes)
ln(Parcel Size)
Time Trend
λ
Adjusted R-square
sigma^2
log-likelihood
Dependent Variable: ln(v1*)

-0.596
0.045
0.021
0.384
0.750
0.198
-92.024
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Developers' true values for land were not significant in the dummy variables of
ring roads.

In addition, land offered at a Type 2 auction affects the value of land

significantly in a negative manner, which demonstrates that the longer developers
consider making a land transaction, the lower the bid.

Finally, developers'

valuations are found to be positively associated with parcel size, which reveals the
fact that developers are more willing to pay for larger land parcels for property
development.

Similar to the model for the government's true valuation, developers'

valuations for land have increased over time.

Although the spatial correlation

coefficient λ is only significant at 10.4% level, it shows that spatial correlation in the
error term exists at least to some degree in the buyer's true valuation.

6. Concluding Remarks
We have thus far estimated the effect of open space and local public
infrastructure on the value of urban land in a market that does not satisfy the usual
assumptions of a competitive market structure, as well as incentive incompatibility
issues for transaction participants.

Our study shows that when confronting these two

violations to the traditional assumptions of hedonic theory, we cannot directly apply a
standard econometric model, due to the monopolistic seller and the incentive
incompatibility issue in the English auction.
market features in two ways.

Instead, we take advantage of these

First, the "asking price" of the government seller is

used to derive its true valuation, so that one can estimate the offer function of the
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monopoly seller. On the buyer's side, following Paarsch's (1997) approach, we
recover the distribution of the buyer's true valuation from a Tobit model estimation
with respect to the auction premium, and then conduct a three-step approach based on
Riley and Samuelson's (1981) study to implicitly solve for the winning buyer's true
valuation through numerical methods. When we have estimated the true valuation
of the winning buyers, the explanatory variables account for the buyers' derived true
valuation fairly well, which allows us to estimate marginal values commonly reported
in the literature.
In addition, these two violations to the traditional hedonic theory also generate
two separate valuations on land with differentiated characteristics.

We find that the

seller and buyers differ in their marginal valuations of these land characteristics to
some degree.

While both placing a high value on local infrastructure (such as

healthcare service level), the local government (i.e., the monopolistic land seller)
values subway station proximity highly, but land buyers (i.e., the developers) exhibit
higher values for road service level.

In regard to proximity to subway stations,

while the government considers it to be a significantly positive factor in determining
property value, developers do not, perhaps because the subway system in Chengdu is
still under construction.

In addition, our results show that location relative to a park

or a river does not matter to either the local government or the developers.
Regulation requirements for land development matter both to the seller and to the
buyers. Notably, the maximum requirement for Plot Ratio significantly affects both
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the land seller and buyers' valuations in a positive manner, which suggests that the
Plot Ratio is, perhaps, the most important economic regulation requirement on land
development.

While the maximum Structure Density Ratio and the minimum

requirement of Green Land Ratio have negative impacts on the land buyers, they do
not significantly affect the land seller.
While developers prefer parcels which consist of a single plot, the land seller
does not.

Locations within the various ring roads are not significant to the

developers, however, "Between 1st and 2nd Ring" has been found significant to the
land seller's valuation in the sense that the closer to the center of the city, the higher
the land seller values.

Unobserved neighborhood effects, as measured by district

variables, have a significant impact on the land valuation for both the land seller and
buyers. Since our omitted district (Jin Jiang District) includes a large part of the most
commercialized downtown area in the city, generally speaking, the suburban districts
are significantly less valued than those in the downtown area.

For all the

participants, the Type 1 auction tends to increase land valuation, but its impact is
slightly larger for the developers than for the local government. Parcel size is also
found to have a significantly positive impact on land valuation of all participants.
Our study is valuable to the land seller.

It addresses one of the core issues in

China's local public financing in that the local governments rely heavily on land sales
for revenue generation, which is usually referred to as the "land financing." After
learning the developer's true valuation on a particular land parcel with given attributes,
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the local government hence can increase the asking price and therefore generate more
profit.

In the future study, we can examine the use of alternative methods, such as a

property tax, to replace the land sales in public financing, while keeping the welfare
level in the economy stable.
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CHAPTER 3
A HEDONIC VALUATION FOR URBAN HOUSING WITH SPATIAL AND
PROJECTS HETEROGENEITY: THE CASE OF CHENGDU, CHINA

Abstract
This study estimates the effect of spatial heterogeneity, project attributes and
housing-unit attributes on the value of urban apartment housing using retail sales data
in a Chinese housing market.

To form the individual spatial weight matrix for each

of the housing projects, we utilize the three-dimensional distances that not only take
the plane coordinates into consideration, but also consider the floor on which the
housing unit is located.

With the aggregate spatial weight matrix transformed from

the individual spatial weight matrices, we estimate both the spatial autoregressive
model and the spatial error model using maximum likelihood.

Our results show that

for project attributes, the Plot Ratio and the weighted aggregate road service level
have negative impacts on housing price, whereas subway station proximity and park
proximity, as well as weighted aggregate healthcare service level, have positive
impacts on housing price.

In regard to housing-unit attributes, our results show that

the coefficients of both inner and outer view variables are positive, while that of the
"adjacent to a road" dummy variable is negative.

In addition, our results confirm the

positive impact of the direction of the major rooms in the housing unit when facing
south, which is consistent with Chinese culture.
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1. Introduction
This study estimates the effects of project attributes and housing-unit attributes
on housing retail unit sales price.

Our study uses data obtained from a Chinese

regional housing market which consists of housing units in different housing projects.
Unlike the "sparse" residential development pattern common in the US and other
countries, the style of residential development in China is relatively more
concentrated and denser.

In fact, many large cities in Asia develop in a similar

manner, and their residential buildings have the "high-rise" shape. Good examples are
Hong Kong and Singapore.

In the past 20 years, the residential development pattern

in mainland China has become more and more dense as high-rise residential
development has expanded from the coastal to the inland region, and is currently the
prevalent urban development pattern.

In contrast, due to its relatively large

endowment of land, residential development in the US is much less dense, but some
large cities such as downtown New York City and Chicago still have many high-rise
residential buildings.

The high-rise residential pattern presents a challenge to the

traditional spatial hedonic approach since the standard two-dimensional concept in
space does not fit the situation well. To our knowledge, no study has been done to
conduct the hedonic estimation with respect to the high-rise residential pattern.
The typical pattern of residential development in China is that a real estate
developer purchases a land parcel from the local government, and then builds several
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residential apartment buildings on the parcel.20

There could be hundreds to

thousands of housing units in a single housing project, depending on the size of the
land parcel as well as the regulation requirement on its development density.

In fact,

given the large and dense housing projects in China, these projects often play a
similar role as an entire community in the US.

Large housing projects in China

usually contain various kinds of open space amenities, sports fields, grocery stores,
restaurants, and even kindergartens. Most of these projects are isolated by walls or
fences, so that only residents and their invited guests can enter the housing projects.
Housing projects in China, therefore, are analogous to "closed communities" in the
US.
For each housing unit within a housing project, we primarily consider two types
of explanatory variables that could affect its sales price: project attributes and
housing-unit attributes.21

For the first category of attributes, we consider those

characteristics that could affect all the housing units within a particular housing
project. Specifically, we examine the development density of the housing project, the
proximity of the project to the nearest subway station and public park, and the overall
healthcare service level as well as the service level of urban road network.

For the

second category of attributes, we consider those characteristics that could affect the

20 In China, all land belongs to the government. The maturity of the
residential developable land is 70 years.
21 The housing sales price in China is usually listed in according to ￥/ m2,
not the total price per unit.
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individual housing unit within each housing project, e.g., whether the housing unit
has a view of an open-space amenity either within a housing project or outside the
project, whether the housing unit is adjacent to a road or street, the unit's floor, the
direction faced by the major rooms of the housing unit, the area of the housing unit,
payment method, and the long term trend of the housing price.
The paper proceeds as follows: first we present a brief review of the traditional
hedonic theory literature and its extension in a spatial context.

After discussing the

housing projects in Chengdu, we introduce the Relative Plane Coordinates System,
and then we present our data.

We then discuss some basic spatial hedonic models

followed by discussion of the aggregate spatial weight matrix generated by the
three-dimensional distances, which is a key feature of this study.

Finally, we present

our estimation results using both spatial autoregressive model and spatial error model
which are estimated by the maximum likelihood approach.

2. Literature Review
Hedonic pricing studies date back to the pioneering works of Lancaster (1966),
Ridker and Henning (1967), among others.

Since the publication of Rosen's (1974)

theoretical model, hedonic theory has been widely used in valuing the impact of
environment and infrastructure on property values.

The hedonic approach has been

used to measure the changes of marginal willingness to pay in environmental
attributes.

Palmquist (1992) argues that marginal prices can measure total benefits
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sufficiently when externalities are localized.

In addition, the hedonic approach uses

data from real market transactions which can control for the hypothetical bias
commonly found in the stated preference methods.

The original hedonic approaches

were used to value air quality; others looked at school quality, open space, mosquito
abatement, road conditions, etc.

In this research, we are primarily interested in how

certain local public goods (i.e., open space and local infrastructure) and housing-unit
attributes influence the housing price.
Open space is broadly defined as parks, rivers, or undeveloped land.

In this

study, our primary interest is public parks located within the main urban area of a city
(see for example, Bolitzer and Netusil, 2000). While most studies consider the
distance from a property to the source of open space, which is normally referred to as
proximity, others have combined a measure of proximity with a measure of size, such
as the area of a park (see Bolitzer and Netusil, 2000, and Mahan et al., 2000, for
examples).22

Other studies have also used a simple dummy variable to identify

nearby open space amenities (see for example, Asabere and Huffman, 2009).

In this

study, we use a combination of these three approaches where applicable.
Gibbons and Machin (2003) and Nelson (1982) are good examples of studies
examining the impact of a transportation system on property value.

Gibbons and

Machin (2003) use a method based on property values to evaluate the economic
22 While most distances are measured from centroid to centroid, there are a
few studies that measure the distance from centroid to edge (see for Mahan et
al., 2000, and Shultz and King, 2001).
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benefits of transport access and transport innovation. They point out two benefits
associated with the accessibility of rail: one is saving on travel times, and the other is
the changes of the distribution of job types and wages.

Essentially, easy access to a

rail system can reduce the commuting costs to a great enough extent that potentially
more-productive and higher-paid city jobs can be accessed.

They define two ways

to access a rail system: one is related to the distance to a station, and the other is the
service frequency at the nearest station.

They find proximity to a railway station and

increased frequency positively affect property values.

In addition, Nelson (1982)

reviews nine studies on the effect of highway noise, finding that highway noise would
cause a belt of roughly 1,000 feet that could negatively affect the nearby property
value.
In addition to open space amenities and local infrastructure, property values are
also regressed on various structural characteristics of the housing units, such as area
of the unit, number of bedrooms, etc. (see for example, Lutzenhiser and Netusil, 2001
and Provencher et al., 2008). A variable capturing the "view" is commonly called
"View variable." Sander and Polasky (2009) define the "View variable" in the
following manner: viewshed area in square meters, standard deviation of elevations in
a viewshed (measure of relief), view richness calculated as percentage of possible
land use and land cover types contained in a viewshed, a viewshed composed of
forest, a viewshed composed of grassy land covers, a viewshed composed of water,
and a dummy variable indicating if a property has a view of downtown.

Their
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results show that proximity to lakes has the greatest impact on home sale value. In
addition, they find that view areal extents and the amount of water and grassy land
covered in views also have positive impact on sale prices.

3. Market Setting and Data
3.1. The City of Chengdu and the Housing Projects
Our data set consists of six housing projects in Chengdu, China.23

We have

1,268 observations (housing units) contained in six different housing projects (211
housing units per project on average).

The city of Chengdu is the capital of Sichuan

Province, which lies in the southwestern part of mainland China, about 1500
kilometers southwest of Beijing.

It is situated at the western edge of the Sichuan

Basin, with nearly 13 million official residents.
monocentric city.

Chengdu has the shape of a standard

The most urbanized part of the city is surrounded by four

concentric ring roads, with a fifth ring road under construction.

Besides the ring

roads, many radius roads also connect the center of the city to its edge in all
directions. Currently, there are two subway lines being constructed from the north
to the south, and from the west to the east, across the city. Our six housing projects
are scattered across the city. Four housing projects are either within or around the
third ring road, whereas the other two are further from the center of the city (see Fig.

23 We obtain sales data in the housing retail market from a local real estate
sales agency, Chengdu SAGA Organization Ltd.
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Fig. 3.1. Location of the Housing Projects

3.1 for the location of the housing projects).

3.2. Relative Plane Coordinates System
Unlike those commonly seen in the related literature, the information we have
does not allow us to geo-code the housing units in each of the six housing projects
using the GPS coordinates, because we do not have access to an up-to-date satellite
image.

In the absence of a GPS coordinate system (see for example, Anderson and

West, 2006, and Bolitzer and Netusil, 2000), some researchers use a "grid" to
geo-code the observations (see for Mahan et al., 2000). Since the housing units in
the US commonly situate in a relatively sparse manner from one to another, the "grid"
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method of geo-coding works fairly well.

In our case, however, housing units within

one housing project are very dense, thus if we simply use a city-wide "grid" to
geo-code these housing units we stand to lose a great deal of accuracy.24
In this study, we rely upon a "Relative Plane Coordinates System." There are
two steps to implement this approach: first, we construct relative plane coordinates
for each housing project; second, we calculate the length of the unit scale of each of
the relative coordinates in meters. We have obtained the site plan of the housing
projects from the local real estate sales agency along with the sales data.

The sales

agency has also assisted us with marking the room numbers of the housing units on
the site plan. With this information we are able to use a simple but efficient way to
geo-code the housing units.
Many graphic editing software programs have an auxiliary function called "ruler"
which helps graphic designers locate elements in the graph more accurately.

In our

case, we use this ruler function to geo-code the housing units. The graphic software
used is Photoshop.25

One example is shown in Fig. 3.2. When we apply the ruler

function, the software generates two rulers on both the top and left edges of the graph
(the site plan in our case). These two rulers can play the role of a coordinates
system.26

After re-scaling the ruler distances, the distance between any two points

24 Some large housing projects may include 3,000 - 4,000 housing units, or
more.
25 Researchers could use any other graphic software that has a "ruler"
function.
26 Note that the origin generated by the software lies on the top-left corner,
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Fig. 3.2. An Example of the Site Plan of the Housing Project with "Ruler"

in the plane is measured in meters.27
but we still have coordinates in a (x,y) pattern. To differentiate this system
from one with height that we will discuss later, we add a term "plane" to it.
This is why we call it "Relative Plane Coordinates System."
27 With this relative system that is not directly comparable for different
housing projects, the scale changes due to the differentiated size of the graph.
It is therefore necessary to transform each distance in different housing
projects to a common scale (meters). We are able to accurately measure the
distance of a given section along the edge in meters, EDGEi, for i=1,2,...,6
denoting the 6 housing projects. Then, we turn to the site plan and find the
corresponding two points along the edge of the site plan. Using the
corresponding coordinates of these two points in our relative system, we
calculate the distance between these two points under the relative plane
coordinates system, denoted by DISTi, for
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3.3. Data Description
We divide the variables in our data set into three categories: Project-Attribute
Variables, Housing-Unit-Attribute Variables, and Other Variables.

For

Project-Attribute Variables, we consider five variables: Plot Ratio, Subway Station
Proximity, Park Proximity, Hospital Aggregate, and Road Aggregate.

Plot Ratio is

the ratio of total floor area to the land parcel area, which is the major index of
development density.

With respect to local infrastructure, we consider subway

station proximity, healthcare service level (i.e., public hospitals), and major urban
road network service level.

Whether to use "proximity" or "level" is not only an

empirical issue, but also a practical issue in the sense that we need to select those
variables which are consistent with common sense.
For example, intuitively a measure of the distance to the nearest subway station
would seem a more appropriate measure than a count of how many subway stations
are surrounding a property.

Subway Station Proximity, therefore, measures the

Haversine distance from the centroid of each housing project to the nearest subway
station.28

Park Proximity measures the distance to the nearest public park in a

i = 1,2,...,6. We then calculate the unit scale of the relative plane coordinates
system, SCALEi, simply by: SCALEi = EDGEi / DISTi, for i = 1,2,...,6.
With this unit scale we can transform (standardize) each distance calculated in
the relative plane coordinates system into meters by a simple multiplication,
which is then comparable among different housing projects across the city.
28 The Haversine formula calculates the distance between any two points on
a sphere. Haversine distance is usually obtained in the following steps: R =
earth's radius (mean= 6,371km), Δlat = lat2 − lat1, Δlong = long2 − long1, a =
sin²(Δlat/2) + cos(lat1) × cos(lat2) × sin²(Δlong/2), c = 2 ×
arcsin{min[1,sqrt(a)]}, d = R × c. Note that all angles are measured in
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similar manner.

Hospital Aggregate measures the weighted aggregate healthcare

service level evaluated at the centroid of each housing project. We use the number of
beds in one hospital as its service level, and the reciprocal of the Haversine distance
between the hospital to the target housing project as its "weight."29 Thus, our
aggregate measure of K public hospitals associated with a housing project located at
latitude u and longitude v is,
a(u,v) =

k/zk

((3.1)

where a(u,v) measures the service level of public hospital in aggregate, ak is the
number of beds in the kth hospital, and zk is the distance from the housing project to
the kth hospital.

In addition, Road Aggregate is calculated in a similar manner.

We

depict the major road network in the city by 70,826 points with the GPS coordinates
(see Fig. 3.1). We assign a unit "1" to all the road location points as their "level," and
follow exactly the same approach as that for the hospitals to calculate the weighted
aggregate road service level.

The descriptive statistics of all the five variables in the

category of Project attributes are reported in Table 3.1.
Sander and Polasky (2009) calculate viewsheds using the VIEWSHED function in
a software called ArcGIS.

Unfortunately, we do not have access to local GIS

database that could satisfy the requirement of the VIEWSHED function in ArcGIS.
We therefore only use the dummy variable approach to represent the "View variables"

radians.
29 We consider all the public hospitals in the city.
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Table 3.1
Descriptive Statistics of Variables in Project Attributes
Plot Ratio
Subway Station Proximity (m)
Park Proximity (m)
Hospital Aggregate
Road Aggregate

in this study.

Mean
4.354
5903.838
1348.407
0.082
8.132

Median
4.380
3215.304
1305.554
0.065
7.466

Std. Dev.
2.723
5535.142
484.032
0.040
2.695

In addition, due to the distinct feature of the Chinese culture, we also

introduce the "Direction variables," which could be considered as special variants of
the standard "View Variables."

In regard to the Housing-Unit-Attribute Variables in

this study, the first thing we need to consider is the "View" of the housing units to
either the major open-space amenity source within each housing project or
open-space amenity source that is outside but adjacent to the housing project.
As the site plan in Fig. 3.2 shows, the major open-space amenity sources within
this small housing project are the swimming pool and some small gardens nearby,
which lie in the center of the project surrounded by the residential buildings. We
assign a value "1" to those housing units that are able to see the swimming pool.

In

addition, to the north of this housing project, a small public park (the green land as
shown in the site plan) is an open-space amenity source outside but adjacent to this
housing project. Again, for those housing units that have a view of this public park,
we assign a value "1."
In addition to these two "amenity" view variables, we also introduce a
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"disamenity" dummy variable to show whether a housing unit is close to the urban
road / street.

Living close to a major urban road (especially directly facing it),

residents would suffer from noise and dust. We therefore expect a negative sign for
the coefficient on this dummy variable. Note that these three "view" variables are
not mutually exclusive.30 Thus, we include each of these three variables in our
estimation.

In our data set, 39.2% of the housing units have view to major inner

open space amenities, 23.1% of the housing units have view to open space amenities
right outside the housing projects, and 31.9% of the housing units are located on the
fringe of the housing projects which are close to urban roads and streets.
In the Chinese culture, people pay attention to the direction of the major rooms
(such as living room, main bedroom, etc.) when they choose the location of their
housing units. Facing south is considered to be the most preferable direction for
living, which is believed to make the room cool in summer and warm in winter. We
therefore use eight dummy variables to depict the direction of the housing units.

In

our data set, 14% of the housing units have their major rooms facing directly to the
South (see Table 3.2).

Since the dummy variables of these eight directions are

mutually exclusive, we omit "Northwest," which has the most observations in the data
set.
Other variables in the category of housing unit attributes include "Floor," "Unit
30 In fact, 14.8% of the observations in our data set have two of these three
attributes at the same time; 6.3% of the observations have all the three
attributes.
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Table 3.2
Descriptive Statistics of Variables in Housing-Unit Attributes and Dependent
Variables
Floor
Unit area (m2)
Distance to major open-space amenity
within each project (m)
Time trend (1= Jan, 2004)
Inner view (1=yes)
Outer view (1=yes)
Close to street (1=yes)
North (1=yes)
North East (1=yes)
East (1=yes)
South East (1=yes)
South (1=yes)
South West (1=yes)
West (1=yes)
North West (1=yes)
Deflated unit sales price (￥/ m2)
Non-deflated unit sales price (￥/ m2)

Mean
10.625
95.125

Median
9.000
89.370

Std. Dev.
7.540
31.965

176.843

97.761

229.999

61.217

62.000

6.9703

39.236%
23.090%
31.858%

----

0.493
0.445
0.478

13%
7%
11%
17%
14%
13%
5%
20%

---------

0.319
0.246
0.300
0.386
0.337
0.330
0.204
0.427

4130.603
5551.158

4256.436
5685.0858

1256.344
1658.371

area," and "Distance to major open-space amenity within each project."

"Floor,"

which shows the number of stories at which the housing unit situates, in fact gives the
height of the housing unit.

"Unit area" is not only a quantitative index, but also a

qualitative index. Normally in the market, the larger the area of the housing unit, the
more luxurious it is considered to be. Thus, by treating "Unit area" as a characteristic
of the housing unit, we expect a positive sign for its coefficient. "Distance to major
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open-space amenity within each project" is a key explanatory variable in this study.
Using our relative plane coordinates system, we obtain the coordinates for each of the
housing units, along with the coordinates of the centroid of the open-space amenity
source within each housing project.

With these coordinates, we could calculate the

Euclidian distance from each housing unit to the source of the in-project open space.
Note that these distances are two dimensional, so that the distance from a housing
unit at the top of a building to the open space source would be the same as that at the
bottom of the building.
Besides the variables in these two categories, we consider two additional other
variables: payment method and time trend. The first shows the choice of payment
method. Normally in China, when consumers purchase housing with cash, not a
mortgage, they receive some discount from the developer. Therefore, we would
expect a negative sign for the coefficient of this variable.

In our data set, 73.5% of

the housing units are purchased via mortgage.
Sales for the entire housing project usually takes a long period of time,31 and the
6 housing projects in our data set were not marketed during the same time period,
thus we need to consider the issue of time in our study. Common approaches to deal
with the time issue are: deflation by a given price index,32 such as housing price
31 In China, the developers usually sell housing units in "batches," thus it
may take several years for large housing projects to complete their
development and sales.
32 See for example, Bolitzer and Netusil (2000) and Lutzenhiser and Netusil
(2001).
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index (HPI), as well as the use of certain time dummy variables.33

In this study, we

also consider a use of a mix of deflation by HPI and a time dummy. The choice of
these three approaches is just an empirical issue, therefore, we use all of them in our
study.

We set January 2004 to be 1, and use a step size of 1 for every additional

month.34
Against each explanatory variable that discussed above, we set the variable of
"Deflated unit sales price" as our dependant variable.35 We use a local monthly
housing price index (HPI) to deflate the short term fluctuation in the actual housing
sales price.36

We set the value of the HPI to be 1 in January 2004, and then divide

the actual sales price by the corresponding value of HPI. Descriptive statistics of all
the variables in the second and the third categories along with the dependent variables
are shown in Table 3.2.

4. Empirical Models
4.1. Spatial Hedonic Models
Rosen's (1974) seminal article proposed an equilibrium model of product

33 See for example, Provencher et al. (2008). The annual dummy variables
are included to represent the temporal shifts in the residential property market.
34 Note that, for the "deflation only" case, we do not include the monthly
dummy variables.
35 Note that, for the case of "dummy only," we do not use the deflated unit
sales prices as the dependent variable. Instead, we directly use the
non-deflated sales price.
36 The housing price index in Chengdu is reported monthly by the National
Development and Reform Commission.
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differentiation. In a competitive market, goods are valued for their utility-bearing
characteristics, and the interactions of buyers and sellers over multiple attributes yield
the hedonic equilibrium price function.

On the supply side, a set of sellers propose

several price schemes over the vector of characteristics z, known as the "offer curve,"
ϕ(z).

On the demand side, many buyers also propose a set of valuation on z, known

as the "bid curve," θ(z).

The price function P(z) is hence an envelope of the tangent

points between the offer and bid functions, as Fig. 3.3 shows.
Since the housing retail market in our study can be considered competitive,
traditional hedonic theory applies.

However, a commonly seen econometric

problem in hedonic modeling is that the data may be spatially correlated.

Anselin

(1988) has shown that OLS estimates are inconsistent under spatial heterogeneity.
quick examination of our data confirms strong spatial correlation.37

A

Although there

are several variants, Anselin (1988) has discussed the two fundamental spatial
econometric models that address the spatial correlation problem — the spatial-lag
(SAR) and spatial-error (SEM) models.
y = ρ ×W ×y + X ×β + e

The functional form of the SAR is,
|(3.2)

whereas the form of the SEM is given by,
y = X × β + u, u = λ × W × u + e

((3.3)

37 We used test statistics for Moran's I-test, a likelihood ratio test, a Wald test,
and a Lagrange multiplier test for spatial correlation in the residuals, and a
Lagrange multiplier test for correlation in the SAR residuals. See Anselin
(1988) and LeSage (1999) for details. All five tests show strong spatial
correlation in the housing unit sales price.
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Fig. 3.3. Hedonic Price Function in the Housing Retail Market

The most important features of these models in Eqs. (3.2) and (3.3), are W, ρ, and
λ, where W is known as the spatial weight matrix, ρ and λ are the spatial lag
coefficients in both SAR and SEM, respectively.

The maximum likelihood

estimation (MLE) approach is the most popular estimation method for the spatial
models.

As Kim et al. (2003) have shown, spatial techniques in hedonic pricing

models usually increase both the R2 and the significance of estimated coefficients.
Further discussion of spatial hedonic models can be found in Irwin (2002) and others.

4.2. Spatial Weight Matrix
There are two difficulties in forming the spatial weight matrix in our study.
First, as normally seen in literature, the spatial weight matrix is constructed in a plane,
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two-dimensional surface.
our data.38

However, a 2-D spatial weight matrix does not apply to

Since the high-rise residential buildings in our data set have multistories,

it is possible that the sales price of two housing units with similar characteristics but
different height are spatially correlated.

However, in a 2-D setting, the distance

between these two units would be zero, which fails to capture the spatial nature in
height. Therefore, we need to extend the traditional 2-D spatial weight matrix into a
three-dimensional (3-D) setting.
Before we formally construct our spatial weight matrix, we need to introduce the
three-dimensional distance. As Fig. 3.4 shows, the 3-D distance in a (x,y,z)
coordinates system is given by line BC, rather than line OB as the 2-D distance in a
(x,y) coordinates system. The 3-D distance BC, therefore, is given as follows:39
BC = [(OA2 + AB2)1/2 + OC2] 1/2

|(3.4)

Once we have obtained the 3-D distances, we follow the standard approach to form
the spatial weight matrix for each of the six housing projects, i.e., use the reciprocal
of the 3-D distances as the elements of the spatial weight matrix. We denote these
six spatial weight matrices by W1,W2,...,W6.
The second difficulty is how to form an "aggregate" spatial weight matrix.
Since our relative coordinates system described previously is not a global coordinates
38 In fact, in our preliminary estimation, the 2-D spatial weight matrix has
done a very poor job. The matrix is nearly singular and cannot be inverted.
39 In the local market, the height of each floor is commonly 3 meters, we
therefore calculate the height of the housing unit, OC, approximately by:
OC = 3 × (Floor - 1).
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Fig. 3.4. Three-Dimensional Distance

system such as GPS, a project-specific spatial weight is not directly comparable to
that of another project.

Each weight matrix is valid only within the limit of the

individual housing project.

However, we could use two approaches to depict the

relationship of the housing units among different housing projects.

Perhaps the

easiest and most straight forward way is to consider the impact of the housing units in
one housing project on housing units in other housing projects to be zero.

While the

distances between different housing units within a housing project are small (usually
measured in meters), the distances between different housing projects are very large
(usually measured in kilometers). We could therefore let the reciprocal of the
distances of the housing units at different housing projects equal to zero. Paying
attention to the dimensions of the elements, we could construct the "aggregate"
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spatial weight matrix as follows:

 W1
O
 ( n 2,n1)
O( n3,n1)
W= 
O( n 4,n1)
O( n5,n1)

O( n6,n1)

O( n1,n 2)
W2
O ( n 3, n 2 )
O( n 4 , n 2 )
O( n 5 , n 2 )
O( n 6 , n 2 )

O( n1,n3)
O( n 2 , n 3 )
W3
O( n 4 , n 3 )
O( n 5 , n 3 )
O( n 6 , n 3 )

O( n1,n 4)
O( n 2 , n 4 )
O ( n 3, n 4 )
W4
O( n 5 , n 4 )
O( n 6 , n 4 )

O( n1,n5)
O( n 2 , n 5 )
O ( n 3, n 5 )
O( n 4 , n 5 )
W5
O( n 6 , n 5 )

O( n1,n 6) 
O( n 2,n 6) 
O ( n 3, n 6 ) 

O( n 4 , n 6 ) 
O( n 5 , n 6 ) 

W6 

((3.5)

where O is zero matrix, and n1,n2,...,n6 stand for the number of observations in each
housing project.

An alternative method of forming the aggregate spatial weight

matrix is to use the reciprocal of the distances among different housing projects (as
measured from centroid to centroid) as the off-diagonal elements.

Specifically, we

would construct the "aggregate" spatial weight matrix in the following manner:


 W1

 1 I
 d 21 ( n 2,n1)
1
  I ( n3,n1)
d
W =  31
1
  I ( n 4,n1)
 d 41
 1 I
 d 51 ( n5,n1)
1
  I ( n 6,n1)
 d 61

1
 I ( n1,n 2)
d12
W2
1
 I ( n 3, n 2 )
d 32
1
 I ( n 4,n 2 )
d 42
1
 I ( n 5, n 2 )
d 52
1
 I ( n 6, n 2)
d 62

1
1
 I ( n1,n3)
 I ( n1,n 4)
d13
d14
1
1
 I ( n 2 , n 3)
 I ( n 2, n 4 )
d 23
d 24
1
W3
 I ( n 3, n 4 )
d 34
1
 I ( n 4 , n 3)
W4
d 43
1
1
 I ( n 5, n 3)
 I ( n 5, n 4 )
d 53
d 54
1
1
 I ( n 6 , n 3)
 I ( n 6, n 4 )
d 63
d 64

1
 I ( n1,n5)
d15
1
 I ( n 2, n 5)
d 25
1
 I ( n 3, n 5 )
d 35
1
 I ( n 4, n 5)
d 45
W5
1
 I ( n 6, n 5)
d 65

1

 I ( n1,n 6) 
d16

1
 I ( n 2,n 6) 

d 26

1
 I ( n 3, n 6 ) 
d 36


1
 I ( n 4,n 6) 
d 46

1
 I ( n 5, n 6 ) 

d 56


W6

(3.6)

where dij is the distance from housing project i to housing project j, for i,j=1,2,...,6;
I(ni,nj) is the identity matrix.
Once we have decided upon a spatial weight matrix, we can implement spatial
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econometric techniques.

We first use the aggregate spatial weight matrix defined in

Eq. (3.5), and then try the one defined in Eq. (3.6). For both matrices, we estimate
both the SAR and the SEM.

The estimation results for the SAR are reported in

Tables 3.3, 3.4 and 3.5, for the cases using HPI deflation, monthly time dummy, and
both deflation and dummy, respectively.

In addition, the results of SEM are reported

in Tables 3.6, 3.7 and 3.8. The results using the aggregate spatial matrix defined in
Eq. (3.6) are similar to those using the one defined in Eq. (3.5), thus we only present
the results using the simpler aggregate spatial weight matrix defined in Eq. (3.5)
here.40

4.3. Estimation Results
Overall, SEM appears to perform better than SAR, in the sense that several key
explanatory variables are more statistically significant even though their signs are
roughly the same. The adjusted R2 of the SEM models are larger than the SAR
models as well.

Among the three SEM models, the one with only a monthly time

dummy (Table 3.7) appears to have the largest R2, however, the sign of "Park
proximity" is not as expected, since a positive sign means that the further away from
the park the higher of the housing price, which is inconsistent with our common sense.
For the cases using HPI deflation (Table 3.6) and the one with both deflation and

40 Estimation results using the aggregate spatial weight matrix defined in Eq.
(3.6) are available upon request.
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Table 3.3
Spatial Autoregressive Model of Deflated Unit Sales Price, PH (￥/ m2), Using HPI
Deflation
Variable
Intercept

Coefficient
1.1505

t-statistic
1.2566

p-value
0.2089

-0.0539
-0.0825
-0.0010
5.2838
-0.0678

-1.2772
-1.2554
-0.1242
1.4339
-1.4123

0.2015
0.2093
0.9012
0.1516
0.1578

0.0001
0.0370
0.0232
-0.0050
-0.0119
-0.0037
-0.0185
-0.0043
0.0494
0.0007
-0.0005
-0.0001
0.0004

0.4861
9.4551
4.7904
-1.1702
-1.9070
-0.5106
-2.7652
-0.9329
7.9155
0.1132
-0.0595
-1.4480
6.3184

0.6269
0.0000
0.0003
0.2419
0.0565
0.6096
0.0057
0.3509
0.0000
0.9098
0.9526
0.1476
0.0000

-0.0140

-4.2672

0.0000

0.9790

126.2010

0.0000

Project-Attribute Variables
Plot Ratio
ln(Subway station proximity)
ln(Park proximity)
Hospital aggregate
Road aggregate
Housing-Unit-Attribute Variables
Floor
Inner view (1=yes)
Outer view (1=yes)
Close to street (1=yes)
North (1=yes)
North East (1=yes)
East (1=yes)
South East (1=yes)
South (1=yes)
South West (1=yes)
West (1=yes)
Distance to inner source
Housing unit area
Other Variables
Pay in cash (1=yes)
ρ
Adjusted R-square
sigma^2
log-likelihood

0.9335
0.0023
2466.5871

Dependent variable: ln(Deflated housing unit price)
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Table 3.4
Spatial Autoregressive Model of Unit Sales Price, PH (￥/ m2), Using Monthly
Time Dummy
Variable
Intercept

Coefficient
1.1929

t-statistic
1.2704

p-value
0.2039

-0.0553
-0.0850
-0.0014
5.4235
-0.0670

-1.2772
-1.2622
-0.1232
1.4437
-1.4320

0.2015
0.2069
0.9020
0.1488
0.1521

0.0002
0.0372
0.0238
-0.0049
-0.0122
-0.0054
-0.0170
-0.0059
0.0484
0.0000
-0.0006
-0.0001
0.0004

0.8121
9.3948
4.8756
-1.1374
-1.9305
-0.7324
-2.9451
-1.2650
7.6454
0.0065
-0.0674
-1.4880
6.1894

0.4167
0.0000
0.0000
0.2554
0.0536
0.4639
0.0032
0.2059
0.0000
0.9948
0.9463
0.1368
0.0000

-0.0135
-0.0000

-4.0578
-0.0243

0.0001
0.9806

0.9790

124.7119

0.0000

Project-Attribute Variables
Plot Ratio
ln(Subway station proximity)
ln(Park proximity)
Hospital aggregate
Road aggregate
Housing-Unit-Attribute Variables
Floor
Inner view (1=yes)
Outer view (1=yes)
Close to street (1=yes)
North (1=yes)
North East (1=yes)
East (1=yes)
South East (1=yes)
South (1=yes)
South West (1=yes)
West (1=yes)
Distance to inner source
Housing unit area
Other Variables
Pay in cash (1=yes)
Time trend
ρ
Adjusted R-square
sigma^2
log-likelihood
Dependent variable: ln(Housing unit price)

0.9321
0.0024
2453.2726
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Table 3.5
Spatial Autoregressive Model of Deflated Unit Sales Price, PH (￥/ m2), Using
Both HPI Deflation and Monthly Dummy
Variable
Intercept

Coefficient
1.2697

t-statistic
1.4208

p-value
0.1554

-0.0551
-0.0858
-0.0008
5.3425
-0.0679

-1.3575
-1.3569
-0.0671
1.5204
-1.4918

0.1746
0.1748
0.9465
0.1284
0.1358

0.0001
0.0371
0.0233
-0.0051
-0.0119
-0.0037
-0.0186
-0.0043
0.0496
0.0008
-0.0004
-0.0001
0.0005

0.5004
9.4538
4.8107
-1.2011
-1.9048
-0.5023
-2.7728
-0.9227
7.9120
0.1298
-0.0436
-1.5345
6.4325

0.6168
0.0000
0.0000
0.2297
0.0568
0.6155
0.0056
0.3561
0.0000
0.8967
0.9652
0.1249
0.0000

-0.0140
-0.0000

-4.2615
-0.0806

0.0000
0.9358

0.9680

104.2122

0.0000

Project-Attribute Variables
Plot Ratio
ln(Subway station proximity)
ln(Park proximity)
Hospital aggregate
Road aggregate
Housing-Unit-Attribute Variables
Floor
Inner view (1=yes)
Outer view (1=yes)
Close to street (1=yes)
North (1=yes)
North East (1=yes)
East (1=yes)
South East (1=yes)
South (1=yes)
South West (1=yes)
West (1=yes)
Distance to inner source
Housing unit area
Other Variables
Pay in cash (1=yes)
Time trend
ρ
Adjusted R-square
sigma^2
log-likelihood

0.9509
0.0023
2463.8601

Dependent variable: ln(Deflated housing unit price)
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Table 3.6
Spatial Error Model of Deflated Unit Sales Price, PH (￥/ m2), Using HPI
Deflation
Variable
Intercept

Coefficient
14.4969

t-statistic
52.9346

p-value
0.0000

-0.3005
-0.5952
-0.0116
21.4001
-0.2268

-4.7624
-6.5643
-0.1106
3.5758
-3.3759

0.0001
0.0000
0.9119
0.0003
0.0007

-0.0002
0.0433
0.0229
-0.0132
-0.0165
-0.0145
-0.0188
-0.0065
0.0561
0.0001
0.0053
-0.0003
0.0009

-0.5301
9.0134
3.5878
-2.4402
-2.0895
-1.4672
-2.2634
-1.1253
6.8528
0.0156
0.5160
-2.6386
7.8160

0.5961
0.0000
0.0003
0.0147
0.0367
0.1423
0.0236
0.2604
0.0000
0.9876
0.6058
0.0083
0.0000

-0.0144

-4.1225

0.0000

0.9660

899.8973

0.0000

Project-Attribute Variables
Plot Ratio
ln(Subway station proximity)
ln(Park proximity)
Hospital aggregate
Road aggregate
Housing-Unit-Attribute Variables
Floor
Inner view (1=yes)
Outer view (1=yes)
Close to street (1=yes)
North (1=yes)
North East (1=yes)
East (1=yes)
South East (1=yes)
South (1=yes)
South West (1=yes)
West (1=yes)
Distance to inner source
Housing unit area
Other Variables
Pay in cash (1=yes)
λ
Adjusted R-square
sigma^2
log-likelihood

0.9736
0.0023
2464.2008

Dependent variable: ln(Deflated housing unit price)
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Table 3.7
Spatial Error Model of Unit Sales Price, PH (￥/ m2), Using Monthly Time Dummy
Variable
Intercept

Coefficient
14.5140

t-statistic
42.5045

p-value
0.0000

-0.2808
-0.5922
0.0143
19.2306
-0.2085

-3.5207
-5.1690
0.1076
2.5450
-2.4660

0.0004
0.0000
0.9144
0.0109
0.0137

-0.0001
0.0433
0.0237
-0.0132
-0.0170
-0.0176
-0.0205
-0.0086
0.0544
-0.0014
0.0050
-0.0003
0.0009

-0.2433
8.9128
3.6710
-2.4085
-2.1199
-1.7576
-2.4467
-1.4736
6.5593
-0.1687
0.4847
-2.5637
7.6168

0.8078
0.0000
0.0002
0.0160
0.0340
0.0788
0.0144
0.1406
0.0000
0.8661
0.6277
0.0104
0.0000

-0.0138
0.0002

-3.9076
0.2483

0.0001
0.8039

0.9730

1012.4403

0.0000

Project-Attribute Variables
Plot Ratio
ln(Subway station proximity)
ln(Park proximity)
Hospital aggregate
Road aggregate
Housing-Unit-Attribute Variables
Floor
Inner view (1=yes)
Outer view (1=yes)
Close to street (1=yes)
North (1=yes)
North East (1=yes)
East (1=yes)
South East (1=yes)
South (1=yes)
South West (1=yes)
West (1=yes)
Distance to inner source
Housing unit area
Other Variables
Pay in cash (1=yes)
Time trend
λ
Adjusted R-square
sigma^2
log-likelihood
Dependent variable: ln(Housing unit price)

0.9748
0.0024
2452.8514
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Table 3.8
Spatial Error Model of Deflated Unit Sales Price, PH (￥/ m2), Using Both HPI
Deflation and Monthly Dummy
Variable
Intercept

Coefficient
14.4433

t-statistic
43.3222

p-value
0.0000

-0.2978
-0.5934
-0.0070
21.0537
-0.2245

-3.8959
-5.3998
-0.0550
2.9093
-2.7688

0.0001
0.0000
0.9562
0.0036
0.0056

-0.0002
0.0432
0.0228
-0.0131
-0.0164
-0.0147
-0.0187
-0.0065
0.0560
0.0001
0.0052
-0.0003
0.0009

-0.5404
9.0004
3.5683
-2.4203
-2.0726
-1.4784
-2.2542
-1.1295
6.8248
0.0070
0.5085
-2.5423
7.7069

0.5889
0.0000
0.0004
0.0155
0.0382
0.1393
0.0242
0.2587
0.0000
0.9944
0.6111
0.0110
0.0000

-0.0144
0.0001

-4.1220
0.1681

0.0000
0.8665

0.9720

995.0180

0.0000

Project-Attribute Variables
Plot Ratio
ln(Subway station proximity)
ln(Park proximity)
Hospital aggregate
Road aggregate
Housing-Unit-Attribute Variables
Floor
Inner view (1=yes)
Outer view (1=yes)
Close to street (1=yes)
North (1=yes)
North East (1=yes)
East (1=yes)
South East (1=yes)
South (1=yes)
South West (1=yes)
West (1=yes)
Distance to inner source
Housing unit area
Other Variables
Pay in cash (1=yes)
Time trend
λ
Adjusted R-square
sigma^2
log-likelihood

0.9737
0.0023
2465.9607

Dependent variable: ln(Deflated housing unit price)
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dummy (Table 3.8), the results appear to be roughly the same. Since the one using
both deflation and dummy has slightly larger R2 and log likelihood values, we
consider the SEM using a mix of deflation and dummy to be the preferable estimation
model in this study.
As Table 3.8 shows, our model seems to work fairly well, in the sense that most
of the key variables have "correct" sign and are statistically significant.

The

adjusted R2 is very large as well. Among project attributes, Plot Ratio has a
negative impact on the housing price, which implies that consumers do not like living
in a very dense housing project, and developers must therefore accept a lower per unit
price the greater the density. Subway station proximity has a strong positive impact
on the housing price which indicates that consumers prefer to living close to a
subway station, and developers can charge a premium on it. Park proximity is also
found positively related to the housing price, however, it is not statistically significant.
The healthcare service level (i.e., Hospital aggregate) has a significant positive
influence on the housing price and its coefficient is very large (which shows that an
increase of one unit of healthcare service level could increase about 21% of the
housing unit price given our semi-log functional form, other things equal).

But

recall that the mean value of the healthcare service level is only 0.082 given our
calculation method, thus it is not easy to increase the weighted aggregate hospital
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service level by one unit.41

In addition, the weighted aggregate of urban road

service level influences the housing price significantly in a negative manner, which
shows that consumers do not like living at a location that is surrounded by a very
dense road network.
In regard to housing unit attributes, the floor on which the housing unit is located
has a statistically insignificant impact on the housing price. This is somewhat
consistent with our expectations since, based on our knowledge of the local market,
the highest housing unit sales price for a high-rise residential building usually occurs
in the middle of the building, particularly when the housing unit faces the inside of
the project; however, it increases as the housing unit is located on a higher floor and
faces the outside of the project.

Both the dummy variables of inner view and outer

view show significantly positive influences on housing price. As expected, the
dummy variable for adjacent to a urban road shows a significantly negative impact on
housing price.
In our estimation results, compared to the omitted directional dummy variable for
facing Northwest, we have identified a strong positive impact of facing South on the
housing price, which is consistent with our expectations. The other six directions have

41 Recall that the healthcare service level is calculated as the summation of
number of beds in hospitals weighted by the distances. Given the distances
(while a household can choose to locate close to a particular hospital, it is
impossible to live close to all the hospitals), it would be difficult to increase
the number of beds in the hospitals to a large degree. Hence, if the healthcare
service level increases from 0.082 to 0.092 (a 0.01 level change), the effect on
the per unit housing price is only 21% × 0.01 = 0.21%.

97
either positive or negative influences on the housing price.

In regard to the plane

distance to the major open-space amenity within each housing project, we have found
that the closer the housing unit lies to a source of major "in-project" open-space
amenity, the higher is the housing price.
For the housing unit area, though, the estimated coefficient is small, its t statistic
is large, which implies price increases as the living area increases.
total price of a housing unit equals its unit sales price times area.

We know that the
Our finding

indicates that the size of the housing unit positively and significantly affects unit sales
price.

What exactly is the premium?

Consider two housing units of sizes 95 m2 and 110 m2, respectively. Assuming
that the unit sales price of the 95 m2 one is 5551￥/m2.42

According to our

estimation results, a 0.0135% increase due to the 15 m2 change in area would result in
an increase of 74.9￥/m2 in the unit sales price, to 5626￥/m2.

For the 110 m2

housing unit, the total premium due to a 15 m2 increase in size would be ￥84,390.43
For the remaining explanatory variables, we find that pay-in-cash significantly
lowers housing price compared to the mortgage payment method, which is consistent

42 In this example, both the area of the housing unit and its unit sales price
are the mean values in our data set.
43 Denoting the total price of a housing unit as TP, since the unit sales price
PH is a function of the housing area M, we have: TP = PH(M) × M. Totally
differentiate TP with respect to M, we have:
TP
TP
 dM = [
 M 0  PH (M 0 )]  dM . In our example, M0 = 95, PH(M0)
M M 0
M M 0
= 5551, and dM = 15.
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with our expectations. For the long term time trend, our estimation results show that
there is a slightly positive but statistically insignificant trend of the housing price in
the long run, which reveals that the short term fluctuation that has been taken out by
deflating it with the monthly housing price index (HPI) explains the time effect of the
local housing market relatively well.

In addition, the spatial lag coefficient of the

error term is large and statistically significant.

This comes as no surprise since

housing units within a given housing project of the high-rise pattern are very close to
each other, which is the typical situation for residential buildings in China.44

5. Concluding Remarks
In this study, we have estimated the effect of spatial heterogeneity in project and
housing-unit attributes on the value of urban housing using retail sales data in a
Chinese regional housing market.

We use three-dimensional distances that consider

the floor on which the housing unit is located to form the individual spatial weight
matrix for each housing project.
Our estimation results show that for project attributes, the Plot Ratio and the
weighted aggregate road service level have negative impacts on housing price,
whereas subway station proximity and park proximity, as well as weighted aggregate
healthcare service level, have positive impacts on housing price.

In regard to

44 Imagine that your housing unit is surrounded by your neighbors from front,
back, left, and right, as well as top and bottom.
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housing-unit attributes, our results show that the coefficients of all the view variables
(both inner and outer) are positive, while the coefficient of the dummy variable
showing whether the housing unit situates adjacent to a road or street is negative.

In

addition, our results confirm the positive impact of the direction of the major rooms
in the housing unit when facing south, which is consistent with Chinese culture.

We

have found evidence of a positive impact of the housing unit area on its unit sales
price, and we have obtained an insignificantly negative coefficient of the floor
variable, which is also consistent with our expectation of the complex relationship
between the floor and the unit sales price. For other variables, although we have
found that payment method affects the unit sales price, our results do not suggest that
there is a significant long term time trend in this price.
This study contributes to the literature not only for its unique data set, but also for
aggregate weight matrix based on 3-D distance.
extended in two ways.

However, this study could be

One is the identification issue.

As Palmquist (1984) has

pointed out, the cost of moving between cities would block the complete integration
of the property markets between cities. Thus, the hedonic price parameters may vary
in different markets even for the same set of explanatory variables. Therefore, if we
could obtain housing retail sales data in other cities in China (especially in those large
cities in the southwestern region, such as Chongqing, Kunming, Guizhou, etc.), then
we are able to compare the estimation results in this study with those at other
markets.
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Another issue is market segmentation. Although we consider the local housing
market to be competitive, in fact the property developer has some pricing power
within the boundary of its housing project.
function in each housing project.

Therefore, there may be a single offer

Hence the estimation parameters may vary among

different housing projects. Therefore, if we could test whether the estimation
parameters are equal across different housing projects, we would be able to identify
possible market segmentation in the same regional housing market.
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CHAPTER 4
HYPOTHESIS TESTING OF HEDONIC PRICE PARAMETERS WITH BOTH
INPUT AND OUTPUT: AN APPLICATION IN CHENGDU, CHINA

Abstract
This study focuses on the profit maximization behavior of the property developer,
which is the key to linking the factor market (i.e., the land market) and the
commodity market (i.e., the housing market) together. With the true valuation of
land derived in Chapter 2, we posit a profit function that considers all costs in the
property development activity, including both the land cost and the non-land costs.
A set of partial derivatives of the profit function with respect to various characteristics
gives us the relationship between the marginal valuations in the land (factor) and
housing (commodity) markets.

We test the theoretical relationship using a spatial

full information maximum likelihood (SFIML), which considers the land market, the
housing market, and the profit maximization behavior of the property developer
together in a joint likelihood function. Finally, we conduct hypothesis tests in both
of these two scenarios to examine the validity of our linked-markets assumption in
the hedonic price estimation.

1. Introduction
In this study, we focus on the profit maximization behavior of the property
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developer, which is the key to linking the factor market (i.e., the land market) and the
commodity market (i.e., the housing market) together. The property developer is
assumed to earn a positive profit arising from the premium in the English auction by
which land is sold in China.

We posit a profit function that considers all costs of

production, including the land cost and the non-land costs.
A set of partial derivatives of the profit function with respect to various
characteristics gives us the relationship between the marginal valuations in the land
and housing markets, providing an opportunity to impose and test constraints on the
estimated parameters.

We use a spatial full information maximum likelihood

(SFIML), which considers the land market, the housing market, and the profit
maximization behavior of the property developer together in a joint likelihood
function. We then use the results from the corresponding separate estimation in the
housing market as a constraint on the SFIML parameters.
The paper proceeds as follows: after reviewing the related literature, we derive a
theoretical model based on the profit maximization behavior of the property
developer with respect to the various characteristics of land and housing.

We then

derive two empirical models: a separate estimation model and a joint estimation
model. Hypothesis tests are conducted in both of these two scenarios.

2. Literature Review
Rosen's (1974) study is often credited as the seminal work in hedonic theory.
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Given the focus of this paper, we draw from two strands of the related literature:
hedonic theory with both inputs and outputs, and theoretical foundations of spatial
urban models related to local public goods.

In the first strand of literature, Heal

(2001) and Palmquist (1989) have discussed the supply side of hedonic theory.

Heal

(2001) extends the model by introducing imperfect competition. Heal states that in a
competitive market for a private good, willingness to pay is not captured by sellers,
but rather is dissipated by competition and remains with the buyers as consumers
surplus.

He suggests that a separate market for the public good would not reach an

efficient level of provision because of the classical free rider problem. A profit
maximizing developer would provide a local public good at the economically optimal
level, assuming the developer balances the tradeoff between development and
conservation of open space.

Obviously, the trade-off shows that more development

means more houses to sell while more open space amenities may increase the per unit
value of the houses.

The household's willingness to pay for the change of

open-space amenity is then derived from the indirect utility function which is the
solution of the classical utility maximization problem.
The core argument of Heal's study is that a market need not automatically and
efficiently provide local public goods.

However, when the developer considers its

profit maximization problem, it is possible that it could efficiently provide local
public good.

This would only occur when the developer is able to develop the

locally recognized environmental asset exclusively.

Heal considers this as a special
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case of first-order price discrimination, which can exist only when the utility function
is strictly concave, and the cost function is strictly convex.
developer must have sole development rights.

In addition, the

Housing prices are positively affected

by local environmental quality; Heal argues that if the developer is aware of that, it
could treat the provision of environmental assets as part of its profit-maximization
problem.
While Rosen (1974) focuses on the different characteristics of the output,
Palmquist (1989) extends the theory by considering the differentiated factors of
production, with a focus on land.

Palmquist uses land as an example of

differentiated production inputs. He assumes that the rental price of land, R, depends
on certain characteristics associated with the land, which are denoted by zi, i=1,2,..., n,
resulting in R = R(z1,z2,...,zn).

Palmquist assumes this differentiated factor is

provided by a landowner and is then used in production activities. The producer's
problem is to maximize πDV =

j × xj,

subject to g(x,z,α) = 0 and πDV

0, where

πDV is the producer's variable profit, vector p consists of the prices of the outputs and
non-land inputs, and g(x,z,α) = 0 is the implicit production function (vector x consists
of outputs and inputs that could be positive or negative). The non-land input
demand function is given by x = x(p,z,α), and hence the producer's bid function for a
land parcel is denoted as θ(z,p,πD,α) = π*DV(p,z,α) - πD, where πD is the desired profit
level.
The supply side is also similar to the Rosen's (1974) model, but the
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characteristics are separated according to whether the landowner is able to alter them.
Palmquist separates the characteristics vector z into two sub-vectors,
and

= (zi+1, zi+2, ...,zn).

components of

= (z1,z2,...,zi)

are characteristics exogenous to the landowner and the

are within its control. The problem for the landowner, therefore, is

to maximize πS = R(

) - C(

r,β), subject to πS

0, where πS represents the

profit of the landowner, R(·
) is the land rental price, C(·
) is some cost function, r is a
vector of input prices, and β is a vector of technology parameters.45

Therefore, the

offer function could be given as φ( , ,πS',r,β) = πS' + C( , ,r,β), where πS' is the
desired profit level of the landowner.

Finally, the combination of the bid function

and the offer function defines the hedonic equilibrium function as the envelope of the
tangent points, which is P = P( , ,r,β).
In the second strand of the literature, Santerre (1985) and Wu (2006) discuss the
theoretical foundation of spatial urban models that are related to local public goods.
Local public goods can affect nearby property values to a significant degree.
Santerre (1985) assumes that the median voter chooses between public and private
inputs when producing the final output of housing services.

The voter's preference

can affect the local government's supply of local public goods.

Santerre considers a

monocentric metropolitan area composed of a number of jurisdictions. All economic
activities take place in the central business district (CBD), and each ring located x
45 By implication, besides the common input price and technology level, the
land owner's cost depends on its "endowment" , as well as how the land
owner wants to "shape" .
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miles from the CBD corresponds to a different jurisdiction.

Voters choose housing

service and a composite private good to maximize their utility.

In their budget

constraint, the rental price of land, rental price of capital, the price of the composite
private good, property tax share, money cost of travel are assumed to be functions of
distance to the CBD. In addition, a congestion variable is introduced to represent the
impure nature of the local public good.

The solution to the utility maximization

problem implicitly yields the demand for local public good.
Santerre uses data which are composed of 110 municipalities from the 11 SMSAs
in Connecticut representing a broad range of local public goods, including local
public education, fire, health, highway, library, parks and recreation, police, and
sanitation service.

The estimation results strongly suggest that distance from the

CBD influences the composition of local public goods, and the findings show that
demand for local public fire protection, parks and recreation, police, and sanitation
services are negatively related to distance from CBD.

In addition, Santerre

estimates several substitution effects between residential land and different types of
local public goods.
Wu (2006) develops an economic foundation to analyze urban development
patterns and their relations to community characteristics. He divides amenities into
two categories: one is exogenous amenities, which are defined as major geographic
features such as rivers, scenery hills, and oceans, or by the idiosyncratic history of
development; the other category is endogenous amenities, which are defined as local
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public services along with the location patterns of different income groups.46

Wu's

basic assumptions include: a central business district (CBD) which is exogenously
determined, households with identical incomes and preferences, and travel cost,
which is a function of the distance between residence and CBD. Amenities are
assumed to vary over the urban landscape, which is setup in a Cartesian coordinate
plane centered on the CBD.
Households are assumed to choose quantity of housing and composite goods, as
well as the location coordinates.

The indirect utility function is fixed at an

exogenous baseline value, after which the household's bid-rent function is identified
implicitly from the indirect utility function.
housing market.

Wu also considers the supply side of the

A competitive residential development industry is assumed to have

constant-returns-to-scale production technology.

The developers choose a

development density (defined as square feet of housing per acre of land) to maximize
their profit, upon a location specific land rent. The zero profit condition yields the bid
rent function for the developers.
Wu considers two types of landscapes: one is a line-featured amenity source such
as a river or ocean shore; the other is an area-featured amenity sources such as a lake
or a park.

He proposes an exponential functional form to calculate the weighted

summation of the total level of amenity at each residential site to every amenity
source.

The bigger the size of the source, and the closer the distance to it, the higher

46 For example, the Forbidden City lies in the center of the city of Beijing.
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the total amenity level.

With a Cobb-Douglas utility function, Wu numerically

simulates the city's land use pattern with different settings of open space amenities.
His simulation results show that while preserving land for open space removes some
land from the path of land use, it may create incentives for even more development.
While most hedonic studies focus solely on the consumer side of the market, the
critical role of the property developer has long been ignored.

In fact, it is the

property developer that links the land and housing markets together. Many studies
just study these two markets separately. Although the study of Palmquist (1989) and
Wu (2006), among others, have shed light on the theoretical link between the factor
and commodity markets, no study that we are aware of has conducted hypothesis tests
to empirically examine this linkage in hedonic price estimation.

3. Theoretical Model
While Wu's (2006) work appears to be the standard approach for spatial urban
models related to local public goods, it does not focus on the role played by the
property developer as a link between the factor (i.e., land) and commodity markets
(i.e., the housing market).

Although Palmquist (1989) points out the importance of

combining the input and output together with respect to the differentiated
characteristics, he does not demonstrate how to empirically test such a link.

Our

goal in this section, therefore, is to derive a theoretical model of land and housing
markets that is empirically testable.
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The second and third chapters have cast some light on this issue.

The second

chapter studies a Chinese regional land market. Given the fact that the local
government plays the role of monopolistic land seller and English auction is used in
the land transaction, the key feature of this chapter is to isolate the offer function of
the seller (i.e., the local government) and the bid function of the buyers (i.e., the
property developers), respectively.

The auction premium (i.e., the difference

between the transaction price and the asking price proposed by the local government)
was used to derive the distribution of the buyer's valuation and hence the market
participants' true valuations on land.
In addition, the third chapter studies the hedonic valuation for urban housing with
both spatial and project heterogeneity in the same regional market.

It uses housing

retail sales data of 6 housing projects with hundreds of housing units each.

Given

the fact that housing development in China is relatively dense, the third chapter,
therefore, utilizes a three-dimensional spatial weight matrix to control for spatial
autocorrelation in the estimation of the hedonic price function.

The reason why we

build our model upon the second and third chapters is that these chapters provide
separate hedonic estimations of the input (i.e., land) and output (i.e., housing) in the
same market, i.e., Chengdu, China.

If we wish to adequately link hedonic models

for inputs and outputs together, we have to discuss them in the same market;
otherwise the estimation results are neither consistent nor comparable.
Henceforth, we assume that the derived true valuation of the developer is θL, and
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the equilibrium housing retail sales price is PH.
m2 .

Both θL and PH are measured in ￥/

Following the second and third chapters, we assume that θL and PH are both

functions of various housing and project characteristics. Thus, we write θL and PH
in the following manner:
θL =θL(PR,X1,X2)

| (4.1)

PH = PH (PR,H,X1,X3)

( ((4.2)

where PR is the Plot Ratio (a density ratio that is the total floor area of the
construction divided by the area of the associated land upon which the housing
project is located), H is floor area of the housing unit, X1 are characteristics common
in the valuation of both land and housing, X2 and X3 are characteristics that are
distinct in the valuation of land and housing, respectively.

PR and X1 are common

attributes in the valuation of both land and housing; to link the input and output
markets, we need to establish the theoretical relationship between the parameters for
PR and X1 in both markets.
In order to form the property developer's profit maximization problem, we need
to introduce a cost function.

Besides the expenditure on land, we consider a

"development cost," which includes the design, construction, administrative, and tax
costs, etc. In order to differentiate this development cost from the land cost, we call it
"non-land costs," denote by CNL as,
CNL = CNL(PR,H,X1,X2,X3)
We consider the property developer's profit maximization problem at the

( (4.3)
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housing-unit (apartment) level.

At the time the land parcel is purchased, the

developer builds several housing units at the same time, if attempting to maximize
profit over all the housing units built on that land parcel.

We evaluate the profit

maximization problem at the housing unit level in order to better match the retail
sales market data for apartments.

Therefore, for each housing unit i, we can define

the property developer's profit as:
Πi = [PHi(PR,Hi,X1,X3) × Hi] - [PL(PR,X1,X2) × LHi] - CiNL(PR,Hi,X1,X2,X3)
|(4.4)
where PL is a per unit actual land sales price, and LHi is the amount of land associated
with housing unit i.

Recall that the Plot Ratio, PR, is the ratio of total floor area that

could be built on the given land parcel divided by the area of that land. Thus, given
a land parcel with area L, the total floor area that could be built on the land parcel is
simply L × PR.

Since the share of the floor area of the target housing unit is Hi / (L

× PR), the share of the land area associated with the housing unit is then given by:47

47 The property developer does not necessarily sell all housing units in its
housing project at the same time. Normally, it develops a housing project in
"batches." The developer could build housing units in some part of the land
parcel, and sell them; then develop another part of the land parcel, etc.
Assuming the developer sells n units of housing at a given time, the total floor
area of these housing units is

in1 H i . Obviously, the ratio of this batch of housing units to the total available
units is in1 H i /(L×PR). Considering the share of the target housing unit in this
batch of housing units, Hi / in1 H i , we could write the expression for LHi as:
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LHi = L × [Hi / (L × PR)] = Hi / PR

((4.5)

Eq. (4.5) is straight forward, since the amount of land associated with the housing
unit is simply the unit's floor area divided by the Plot Ratio.
In the second chapter, we have calculated the developer's derived valuation θL
with an assumption of zero profit, which means that θL is the maximum amount that
the developer would bid in the English auction.

However, if the price actually paid

for land (PL) is less than θL, the property developer clearly anticipates a positive profit
in its property development activity.
Assuming that all factors of production other than land are paid according to the
value of their marginal product, the anticipated profit from development is θL - PL,
thus for each housing unit, the anticipated profit is (θL - PL) × LHi. This anticipated
profit arises from incentive incompatibility problem in the English auction, since the
winner only needs to pay the amount at which the second highest bidder quits plus the
last increment in the auction.

Given Eq. (4.5), we can rewrite Eq. (4.4) as follows:

[θL(PR,X1,X2) - PL] × Hi / PR
= PHi(PR,H,X1,X3) × Hi - PL(PR,X1,X2) × Hi / PR - CiNL(PR,H,X1,X2,X3) ||||(4.6)
In Eq. (4.6), the left hand side is the anticipated profit associated with
development of the target housing unit.

On the right hand side, PHi(PR,Hi,X1,X3) ×

Hi is the revenue of selling housing unit i, θL(PR,X1,X2) × (Hi / PR) is the allocated
LHi = L × [ in1 H i /(L × PR)] × (Hi / in1 H i ) = Hi / PR, which is exactly the same
as that in Eq. (4.5).
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land cost for housing unit i, and CiNL(PR,Hi,X1,X2,X3) is the non-land costs associated
with development of housing unit i besides the expenditure on land.

Although we

have no preliminary assumption about the functional form of the non-land costs CiNL,
apparently it could be solved immediately from a transformation of Eq. (4.6) as:
CiNL(PR,Hi,X1,X2,X3) = PHi(PR,Hi,X1,X3) × Hi - θL(PR,X1,X2) × (Hi / PR)| (4.7)
Since PR>0 and Hi >0, we can rearrange Eq. (4.6) in the following manner:
θL(PR,X1,X2) = PHi(PR,H,X1,X3) × PR - CiNL(PR,H,X1,X2,X3) × PR / Hi

((4.8)

The property developer is assumed to be a profit maximizer, therefore, we could
consider it to be maximizing its profit over the various characteristics.

Given our

research problem in this paper, we are only interested in those common characteristics,
i.e., PR and X1.

We then could differentiate Eq. (4.8) with respect to PR and X1 as

follows:

θL(PR,X1,X2)/PR = [PHi(PR,H,X1,X3)/PR] × PR + PHi(PR,H,X1,X3)
marginal revenue with respect to PR
|- [CiNL(PR,H,X1,X2,X3)/PR] × PR / Hi - CiNL(PR,H,X1,X2,X3) / Hi
marginal cost with respect to PR

( (4.9)

θL(PR,X1,X2)/ X1 = [PHi(PR,H,X1,X3)/ X1] × PR
marginal revenue with respect to X1
- [CiNL(PR,H,X1,X2,X3)/ X1] × PR / Hi
marginal cost with respect to X1

(4.10)

Eqs. (4.9) and (4.10) are what we need to link the estimation parameters for the
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hedonic price functions both in the land and housing markets.

They are not new to

us if we recall the case of monopolistic seller in the standard production theory.

In

our case, though, the market is assumed to be competitive, since the prices are
functions of the characteristics, the terms in the big bracket are nothing but the
standard "marginal revenue minus marginal cost."
Marginal revenue in Eq. (4.9) is composed of the sales price of the marginal
housing unit, plus the change in the price of all housing units in response to a change
in housing density. Marginal costs are composed of per unit area non-land costs,
plus the change in per unit non-land costs associated with a change in housing density.
Eq. (4.10) is interpreted similarly for characteristics X1.

4. Data
Our study uses the same data sets used in the second and third chapters.
second chapter uses a land wholesale data set in Chengdu city, China.
one of largest inland cities in mainland China.

The

Chengdu is

As the capital city of Sichuan

province, it lies in the southwestern part of China, which is about 1500 kilometers
southwest of Beijing.

With nearly 13 million official residents, the shape of

Chengdu is a standard monocentric city, the core metropolitan area of which consists
of four concentric ring roads and several radius roads.
Three hundred and fifty effective land transactions for residential development
were recorded between January 2004 and October 2009, most of which lie between
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the second and the third ring road (34%), and are then manually geo-coded into GIS
coordinates.

In the land data set, we have information on transaction date, type of

English auction, the size of the parcel, asking price by the local government, and the
actual transaction price.48

We also have information on development regulations,

such as the Plot Ratio. In addition, for each of the land parcel, we have information
on calculated proximity and aggregate level to different sources of open space
amenities and local infrastructure, such as parks, rivers, subway stations, roads, and
public hospitals.49,50 Descriptive statistics for this data set are contained in Tables 2.1
and 2.2 in the second chapter.
The housing retail sales data set used in the third chapter consists of six housing
projects, four of which are located around the third ring road.

This data set includes

1,268 observations in total, with an average of 211 housing units in each housing
project.

This data set includes information on both the project and housing-unit

attributes. Plot Ratio, Subway Station Proximity, Park Proximity, Hospital Aggregate,
and Road Aggregate are included in the former category.

In the latter category, there

are "view" dummies, such as whether the housing unit has a view to an open-space
48 The only difference between the two types of auction is the length of time
period that the potential buyers could bid.
49 Proximity is calculated as the distance from the centroid of a land parcel to
the centroid of a source of open space amenity or local infrastructure using the
Haversine Formula.
50 Aggregate level is calculated as weight aggregate of the "service level"
from each source of open space amenity or local infrastructure, using the
inverse distance from centroid to centroid as the weights. The service level
varies depending on the type of the source, such as the size of the park, the
number of available beds in the hospital, etc.
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amenity sources either within or outside the housing project, whether the unit is
located adjacent to a major road, as well as the direction the housing units face.51

In

addition, housing sales price, the floor number, area of the housing unit, distance to
major open-space amenity within each project, and transaction date are also included
in the data set as well.

Descriptive statistics for this data set are included in Tables

3.1 and 3.2 in the third chapter.
In this study, we need to combine the land wholesale data set and the housing
retail sales data set together.

Unfortunately, we can only identify 4 of the 6 housing

projects as the raw land parcels in the land data set with 350 observations (see Fig.
4.1).

This difficulty limits us to only 3 characteristics that are common in the

estimation of both the land and housing markets.

We therefore choose those factors

that are both rich in economic meaning and statistically significant.

Three common

factors include Plot Ratio, proximity to subway station, and aggregate service level of
urban road.

Using the notation described in section 3, Plot Ratio is "PR," proximity

to subway station and aggregate road service level are "X1." All other explanatory
variables in the second chapter are treated as "X2," and those in the third chapter are
treated as "X3."
For the four housing projects included in this study, we have 851 observations,

51 In the Chinese culture having the major rooms facing south (such as living
room, main bedroom, etc.) is considered to be the most preferable direction for
living.
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Fig. 4.1. Spatial Distribution of Land Parcels and Housing Projects

roughly 213 housing units per housing project on average over 46% of the housing
units have a view to major open space amenities within the housing projects, 40% of
the housing units have a view to some source of open space amenities outside the
projects, while 34% of the housing units situate close to a major urban road.

In

regard to the direction of the major rooms in the housing units, 17% are facing north,
8% northeast, 19% southeast, 7% south, 2% southwest, 4% west, and 30% northwest.
No observations faced east.

In addition, about 75% of the housing units are
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purchased via mortgage, while 25% are paid in cash.

Descriptive statistics are

reported in Table 4.1.

5. Empirical Models
5.1. Separate Estimation Model
Following the semi-log functional form used in the estimations of Chapters 2 and
3, we assume that both θL and PH have exponential forms.

Thus, we can rewrite θL

and PH as follows:
θL = exp( L-PR PR + L-X1 X1 + L-X2 X2)

|(4.11)

PH = exp( H-PR PR + H-H H +  H-X1 X1 + H-X3 X3)

|(4.12)

where  L-PR, L-X1 and L-X2 are the parameters for PR, X1 and X2 estimated in the
second chapter, and  H-PR, H-H,  H-X1 and H-X3 are the parameters for PR, H, X1 and
X3 estimated in the third chapter.

In addition, we assume that the non-land costs CNL,

has a semi-log functional form with respect to various characteristics as well.

Thus,

we have:
CNL = exp(C-PR PR + C-H H + C-X1 X1 + C-X2 X2 + C-X3 X3)

(4.13)

However, since we only have data on 4 housing projects that could be identified as
the raw land parcels in the land wholesale data set, we are unable to implement the
regression on the full set of explanatory variables in Eq. (4.13).

We therefore have

to eliminate X2 from Eq. (4.13), and hence we end up with the following functional
form for CNL:
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Table 4.1
Descriptive Statistics for the 4-project Data Set
Mean

Median

Std. Dev.

4.363
3000.556
8.831
7393.974
5843.329

4.780
1474.832
10.295
10574.990
8254.638

0.731
2419.188
2.207
4011.584
3112.034

8063.476

9024.962

2269.026

9807.723

11273.550

2959.034

7557.051

8758.900

2399.368

212.842

99.499

257.032

92.469
6087.727

85.730
5875.110

1418.518
0.003

4519.693

4356.167

1033.613

12.800

11.000

7.750

Project attributes
Plot Ratio
Subway station proximity (m)
Road level
Land unit sales price (￥/ m2)
Deflated land unit sales price (￥/ m2)
True land valuation with deflation only
(￥/ m2)
True land valuation with only dummy
(￥/ m2)
True land valuation with both deflation
and dummy (￥/ m2)
Housing unit attributes
Distance to major open-space amenity
within each project (m)
Housing unit area (m2)
Housing unit sales price (￥/ m2)
Deflated housing unit sales price
(￥/ m2)
Floor in which the unit situates

CNL = exp(C-PR PR + C-H H + C-X1 X1 + C-X3 X3)

((4.14)

The corresponding regression equation in the log form is as follows:
log(CNL) = αC + C-PR PR + C-H H + C-X1 X1 + C-X3 X3 + eC

|(4.15)

where αC and eC, respectively, are the corresponding intercept term and random error
component in the regression.

As pointed out in the second and third chapters, time

is an important factor that could affect the estimation results for the cross sectional
data covering a long period of time.

We therefore have three choices in dealing with
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the time effect: deflation only by certain price index, either housing price index (HPI)
or consumption price index (CPI), only time dummies, as well as a combination of
these two approaches.
be the best.

It is completely an empirical issue to determine which one to

In this study we implement each of these three approaches, and then

apply the corresponding version of θL and PH to Eqs. (4.9) and (4.10), respectively.
The results of the estimation of Eq. (4.15) are reported in Table 4.2 with deflation
only by a monthly housing price index, in Table 4.3 with only monthly dummies but
no deflation, and in Table 4.4 with both deflation and dummy.52,53
Although the regression of the non-land costs CNL, is an intermediate step for us
to form the constraint that is used later in our analysis, it is worth spending some time
discussing the coefficients values in Tables 4.2 to 4.4. The negative sign on the
coefficient for Plot Ratio is as expected, since the higher the housing project's density,
the more the developer could build. Thus, it is simply an economy of scale that the
non-land costs for each housing unit would be lower. The positive sign of Road
aggregate is consistent with common sense, since a location that has denser aggregate
road service level is commonly more commercialized. Construction in such location
incurs higher costs than elsewhere.

For example, comparing a housing project in

downtown with an identical housing project in a suburban area, it would be more

52 This housing price index of Chengdu is reported monthly by an authority
called the National Development and Reform Commission.
53 We set the monthly time trend variable, starting with January 2004 equal
to one and ending with October 2009 equal to 70.
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Table 4.2
OLS Estimation of Unit Non-land Costs, CNL (￥/ m2), Using HPI Deflation
Variable
Intercept

Coefficient
11.884

t-statistic
97.534

p-value
0.000

-13.263
0.181
56.215

0.000
0.856
0.000

3.926
20.188
3.245
13.940
-6.321
-9.038
-2.646
-5.283
-2.591
-4.330
-0.819
68.374
-3.426

0.003
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.021
0.000
0.005
0.008
0.132
0.000
0.000

Project-Attribute Variables ("PR" and "X1")
Plot Ratio
ln(Subway station proximity)
Road aggregate

-0.441
0.002
0.175

Housing-Unit-Attribute Variables ("H" and "X3")
Floor
Inner view (1=yes)
Outer view (1=yes)
Close to street (1=yes)
North (1=yes)
North East (1=yes)
South East (1=yes)
South (1=yes)
South West (1=yes)
West (1=yes)
Distance to inner source
Housing unit area
Pay in cash (1=yes)

0.001
0.183
0.028
0.131
-0.067
-0.132
-0.023
-0.078
-0.031
-0.074
-0.000
0.010
-0.023

Adjusted R-square
sigma^2

0.974
0.006

Dependent variable: ln(Per unit housing cost with deflation only)

costly to transport construction waste out of the city, or there may be additional fees
charged for the noise and dust associated with the construction in the downtown area.
Now, substitute Eqs. (4.11) and (4.12), along with (4.14), into Eqs. (4.9) and
(4.10), we have:
exp( L-PR PR + L-X1 X1 +  L-X2 X2) ×  L-PR
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Table 4.3
OLS Estimation of Unit Non-land Costs, CNL (￥/ m2), Using Monthly Time
Dummy
Variable
Intercept

Coefficient
12.461

t-statistic
102.011

p-value
0.000

-11.336
-3.244
28.619

0.000
0.000
0.000

4.390
19.541
3.305
13.740
-6.043
-9.185
-2.680
-5.208
-2.659
-4.314
-0.912
66.907
-3.160
1.810

0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.012
0.000
0.005
0.002
0.161
0.000
0.000
0.095

Project-Attribute Variables ("PR" and "X1")
Plot Ratio
ln(Subway station proximity)
Road aggregate

-0.429
-0.040
0.165

Housing-Unit-Attribute Variables ("H" and "X3")
Floor
Inner view (1=yes)
Outer view (1=yes)
Close to street (1=yes)
North (1=yes)
North East (1=yes)
South East (1=yes)
South (1=yes)
South West (1=yes)
West (1=yes)
Distance to inner source
Housing unit area
Pay in cash (1=yes)
Time trend
Adjusted R-square
sigma^2

0.002
0.178
0.029
0.129
-0.064
-0.135
-0.024
-0.077
-0.032
-0.074
-0.000
0.010
-0.021
0.002

0.972
0.006

Dependent variable: ln(Per unit housing cost with only dummy)

= exp( H-PR PR + H-H Hi +  H-X1 X1 + H-X3 X3) × H-PR PR
+ exp( H-PR PR + H-H Hi +  H-X1 X1 + H-X3 X3)
- exp( C-PR PR + C-H Hi + C-X1 X1 + C-X3 X3) ×  C-PR PR / Hi
- exp( C-PR PR + C-H Hi + C-X1 X1 + C-X3 X3) / Hi

(4.16)
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Table 4.4
OLS Estimation of Unit Non-land Costs, CNL (￥/ m2), Using Both HPI Deflation
and Monthly Dummy
Variable
Intercept

Coefficient
11.870

t-statistic
97.366

p-value
0.000

-12.531
-0.234
31.931

0.000
0.815
0.000

3.964
20.173
3.256
14.052
-6.223
-9.197
-2.735
-5.197
-2.694
-4.353
-0.859
66.848
-3.398
1.964

0.000
0.000
0.001
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.006
0.000
0.007
0.001
0.391
0.000
0.001
0.050

Project-Attribute Variables ("PR" and "X1")
Plot Ratio
ln(Subway station proximity)
Road aggregate

-0.474
-0.003
0.184

Housing-Unit-Attribute Variables ("H" and "X3")
Floor
Inner view (1=yes)
Outer view (1=yes)
Close to street (1=yes)
North (1=yes)
North East (1=yes)
South East (1=yes)
South (1=yes)
South West (1=yes)
West (1=yes)
Distance to inner source
Housing unit area
Pay in cash (1=yes)
Time trend

0.002
0.183
0.028
0.132
-0.066
-0.134
-0.024
-0.077
-0.032
-0.074
-0.000
0.010
-0.022
0.002

Adjusted R-square
sigma^2

0.974
0.006

Dependent variable: ln(Per unit housing cost with both deflation and dummy)

exp( L-PR PR + L-X1 X1 +  L-X2 X2) ×  L-X1
= exp( H-PR PR + H-H Hi + H-X1 X1 +  H-X3 X3) ×  H-X1 PR
- exp( C-PR PR + C-H Hi + C-X1 X1 + C-X3 X3) × C-X1 PR / Hi

(4.17)

After some rearrangement, Eqs. (4.16) and (4.17) can be rewritten as follows:
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θL ×  L-PR = PHi × H-PR PR + PHi - CiNL × C-PR PR / Hi - CiNL / Hi

((4.18)

θL × L-X1 = PHi × H-X1 PR - CiNL × C-X1 PR / Hi

((4.19)

Since Eqs. (4.18) and (4.19) hold at the per housing unit level, in order to use our
data and implement the hypothesis test, we need to add these equations over all
observations in our data set. We use j to denote the jth housing project, for j=1, 2, 3,
4.

We also assume that in each of these housing projects, there are a total of nj
Denoting each housing unit by i, noting the fact that θL and PR vary

housing units.

among different housing projects, and the estimation parameters (i.e., the s) are
constant across all the housing units in the data, we therefore can add up Eqs. (4.18)
and (4.19) in the following manner:
nj

nj

4

nj

nj

L-PR  Lj = H-PR  ( PHij  PR j ) +  PHij - C-PR  (
4

4

j 1 i 1

4

j 1 i 1

CijNL  PR j
H ij

j 1 i 1

j 1 i 1

nj

CijNL

j 1 i 1

H ij

4

) -  (

)

|(4.20)
nj

4

nj

nj

L-X1  Lj = H-X1  ( PHij  PR j ) - C-X1  (
4

4

j 1 i 1

CijNL  PR j
H ij

j 1 i 1

j 1 i 1

)

|(4.21)

Denoting  L-PR and  L-X1 as the calculated constraints on the estimation
parameters, Eqs. (4.20) and (4.21) can be rearranged as follows:
nj

4

nj

nj

 L-PR = { H-PR  ( PHij  PR j ) +  PHij - C-PR  (
4

4

j 1 i 1

nj

CijNL

j 1 i 1

H ij

4

-  (
 L-X1

j 1 i 1

j 1 i 1

4

H ij

)

nj

) } / (  Lj )

nj

| (4.22)

j 1 i 1

4

nj

= { H-X1  ( PHij  PR j ) - C-X1  (
4

CijNL  PR j

j 1 i 1

j 1 i 1

CijNL  PR j
H ij

4

nj

) } / (  Lj )
j 1 i 1

|(4.23)
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Table 4.5
Summary of the Target Estimation Parameters in Land
Deflation only
Only dummy
Both deflation and dummy

L-PR

L-Road-aggregate

L-Subway-proximity

0.132
0.079
0.077

0.045
0.077
0.076

-0.080
-0.040
-0.044

Source: The second chapter

Table 4.6
Summary of the Target Estimation Parameters in Housing
Deflation only
Only dummy
Both deflation and dummy

H-PR

H-Road-aggregate

H-Subway-proximity

-0.301
-0.271
-0.299

-0.227
-0.200
-0.226

-0.595
-0.583
-0.595

Source: The third chapter

Eqs. (4.22) and (4.23) are what we need to conduct the hypothesis testing.

We,

therefore, setup the null hypothesis as follows:

L-PR =  L-PR

( (4.24)

L-X1 =  L-X1

|(4.25)

In Eqs. (4.24) and (4.25), L-PR and L-X1 are the estimation parameters in the second
chapter, whereas  L-PR and  L-X1 are calculated in this study in Eqs. (4.22) and
(4.23), with  H-PR and  H-X1 obtained from the third chapter. A summary of these
target estimation parameters for land and housing from previous chapters are reported
in Table 4.5 and Table 4.6, respectively. In addition, the calculated constraints for the
target estimation parameters are reported in Table 4.7. We therefore conduct an F test
for each set of the constraints.

With deflation only by HPI, the calculated value of
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Table 4.7
Calculated Constraints for the Target Estimation Parameters

L-PR
Deflation only
Only dummy
Both deflation and dummy

0.2630
0.3701
0.3443

L-Road-aggregate
-1.2034
-1.1649
-1.2179

L-Subway-proximity
-2.0465
-2.0179
-2.0275

the F statistics is 2129.6; with only monthly time dummy, the calculated value of the
F statistics is 2888.1; with both deflation and dummy, the calculated value of the F
statistics is 3149.5. Given the critical value of 4.61 at 1% significance level or 3.00
at 5% significance level, we reject the null hypothesis of the valid constraints in each
of these three cases.
This result should come with no surprise that, we have rejected the null
hypothesis of equal parameters in the land estimation and in the derivation from the
housing market.

As Ellickson (1981) has pointed out, complex relationships in the

hedonic price function often result in the varying estimation coefficients from
neighborhood to neighborhood. In our case, although we have 350 land parcels
scattered throughout the city, we only have 4 housing projects that can be identified
as the raw land parcels.

Hence, the representative power of these 4 housing projects

could be limited or even somewhat biased with respect to the whole 350 land parcels.

5.2. Joint Estimation Model
As Ellickson (1981) has argued, the ability of hedonic theory to treat housing
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characteristics simultaneously is obscured by one's practical approach of discussing
one attribute at a time, while treating others as fixed.

In our case, characteristics

from both the land market and the housing market, as well as the profit maximization
behavior of the property developer, could have either positive or negative impacts on
the housing sales price.

Therefore, to link the land and housing markets together, it

is necessary to conduct an overall examination of the effect of various characteristics
on the housing price.
To our knowledge, few studies have been done to conduct hedonic analysis
through joint estimation.

One of the few exceptions is Al Refai (1994).

Al Refai

divides housing assets into land and structure, and uses an iterative three-stage least
square (I3SLS) approach to simultaneously estimate land, structure, as well as the
proportion of housing in total wealth. Given the spatial nature of our research
problem, 3SLS approach is not appropriate to us (primarily for the efficiency issue).
We therefore turn to another joint estimation method, i.e., the full information
maximum likelihood (FIML) approach.
Discussion of FIML dates back to Chow (1968) and Eisenpress (1962), among
others. Since then, FIML has been applied in a wide range of studies.

We consider a

joint estimation method that combines land market sales, housing market sales, and
the non-land costs together, using FIML estimation. We therefore consider a joint
probability density function fjoint(θL,PH,CNL), which can be rewritten via an
application of Bayes's rule as follows:
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fjoint(θL,PH,CNL) = fθL(θL) × fPH(PH|θL) × fC(CNL|θL,PH)

(4.26)

Land and housing market evaluations can be considered as two independent
processes, however, the distribution of non-land costs CNL is determined by the
linkage of the land and housing markets, as shown in Eq. (4.7). Thus, we can
rewrite Eq. (4.26) as:
fjoint(θL,PH,CNL) = fθL(θL) × fPH(PH) × fC(CNL|θL,PH)

|(4.27)

where, fθL(θL) and fPH(PH) are the probability density functions of the true land
valuation and the housing retail sales price, respectively, and fC(CNL|θL,PH) is the
conditional probability density function of non-land costs, which depends upon the
true land valuation and the housing retail sales price.

Eq. (4.7) describes a linear

relationship among θL, PH and CNL, which is different from our previous models
which used the log form of the key variables, i.e., lnθL, lnPH and lnCNL.

Therefore,

for each of the three variables in our previous approach, Eq. (4.27) must be measured
in its original form, not in log form.
Before we proceed to derive Eq. (4.27), it is worth spending some time
discussing the structure of the equation's three components.

From our previous

discussion, we know that OLS estimation works fairly well for non-land costs.
However, estimation of the housing retail sales price does best using the spatial error
model (SEM), which is quite different from the OLS model. The standard SEM has
a functional form as follows:
y = X × β + η, η = λ × W × η + e

|(4.28)
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where λ is the spatial lag coefficient, and W is commonly known as the spatial weight
matrix, which is typically constructed with element i, j as the inverse distance
between location i and j.
term.

In this case, y - X × β is no longer the actual disturbance

Rather, η = λ × W × η + e is the true error term, which can be transformed as

follows:
e = (I - λ × W) × η

|(4.29)

Thus, η can be expressed as (I - λ × W)-1 × e, and hence we have:
y = X × β + (I - λ × W)-1 × e
Now again consider Eq. (4.27).

|(4.30)
In the second chapter, the distribution of the

true land valuation θL is transformed from the distribution of the disturbance term in
a Tobit model estimation as follows:
fθL(θL) = feL(θL – r − βTobit XL)

| (4.31)

where r is the asking price proposed by the land seller (i.e., the local government) in
the English auction, βTobit is the vector of estimation parameters of the Tobit model, XL
is the set of explanatory variables in the land market, and feL(·
) is the probability
density function of the disturbance term in the Tobit estimation, which is distributed
as N(0,  L2 ).
Transforming the distribution of eL to the distribution of θL, we know that the
mean of θL, μL, is βTobit XL + r, and the variance of θL,  2L , is simply  L2 .

For the

distribution of the housing retail sales price, by Eq. (4.30),we have:
PH = XH × βH + (I - λ × W)-1× eH

|(4.32)
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where XH is the set of explanatory variables in the housing market, βH is the
corresponding vector of housing estimation parameters, and eH is the disturbance term,
which is distributed as N(0,  H2 ). Thus, the disturbance term can be expressed as
follows:
eH = (I - λ × W) × (PH - XH × βH)

(

(4.33)

Transforming the distribution of eH to the distribution of PH, we know that the mean
2
of PH, μH, is XH × βH, but the variance of PH,  PH , is a bit more complicated to

derive.
From Eq. (4.32) we know that it is the term (I - λ × W)-1× eH that determine
2
 PH
. Denoting P = (I - λ × W)-1, the ith row of P× eH is then expressed as

 P e
ij

Hj

,

j

where j denotes the jth element in each row of P.
element of its variance is

P

2
ij

PH is a vector, hence the ith

  H2 . According to the standard homoscedasticity

j

assumption, we can add up all the terms and make average, and then we have:
2
 PH
=  H2    Pij2 / n
i

|(4.34)

j

where n denotes the number of observations in the data set. Using the property of
trace operation, "trace (P' × P) =

P

2
ij

i

," Eq. (4.34) can be rewritten as follows:

j

2
 PH
=  H2 × trace(P' × P) / n

=  H2 ×trace{[(I - λ × W)-1]' × (I - λ × W)-1} / n

|(4.35)

2
If we define: Tr = trace{[(I - λ × W)-1]' × (I - λ × W)-1} / n,  PH can be expressed as:

Tr × H2 .
Turning now to the conditional distribution of non-land costs CNL, things become
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more complicated.

From the relationship shown in Eq. (4.7), we can obtain the

conditional distribution of CNL by transforming the unconditional distribution of θL
and PH, since a linear combination of two normal distributions is still a normal
distribution. Transforming the elements operations into matrix notation, and noting
that there would be no covariance term due to the independence assumption of θL and
PH, we would have the mean of CNL, μC, and the variance of CNL,  C2 , as follows:
μC = diag(H') × XH × βH - (H ./ PR) .× (βTobit XL + r)

(4.36)

 C2 = (H' × H / n) × Tr × H2 + [(H ./ PR)' × (H ./ PR )/ n] × L2

|(4.37)

where diag(H') denotes a diagonal matrix with elements of the vector H, " ./ " and
" .× " denote the dot operations.

Now, with the information of the mean and

variance of θL, PH and CNL, we could construct the full-information log-likelihood
function, denoted by lnL, as follows:
lnL = [-

n
n
1
× log(2 × π) - × log(  L2 ) × (θL - μL)' × (θL - μL)]
2
2
2   L2

+ [-

-

1
× (PH - XH × βH)' × (I - λ × W)' × (I - λ × W) × (PH - XH × βH)]
2   H2

+ [||

n
n
×log(2 × π) - × log(  H2 )
2
2

n
n
1
× log(2 × π) - × log(  C2 ) × (CNL - μC)' × (CNL - μC)]
2
2
2
2  C
||||(4.38)

In Eq. (4.38), μL and  L2 are assumed given by the second chapter, βH, λ,  H2 are
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treated as unknown parameters to be estimated, and μC,  C2 are given by Eqs. (4.36)
and (4.37). Given the distinct spatial feature of Eq. (4.38), we call it Spatial Full
Information Maximum Likelihood (SFIML) Estimation.

Taking derivatives of lnL

with respect to βH, λ, and  H2 , we have the following first order conditions:
 ln L
1
= 2 × XH' ×(I - λ × W)' × (I - λ × W)× (PH - XH × βH)
 H
H

+

1
× XH' × [diag(H')]' × [Δ- diag(H')×XH × βH] = 0
 C2

|(4.39)

where, Δ = CNL + (H ./ PR) .× (βTobit × XL + u)

 ln L
1
= 2 × (PH - XH × βH)' × W' × (I - λ × W) × (PH - XH × βH)

H
-

n 1  C2
 C2
1
× 2×
+
×
× (CNL - μC)' × (CNL - μC) = 0 ||(4.40)
4
2  C 

2  C

n 1
 ln L
1
=- × 2 +
× (PH - XH × βH)' × (I - λ × W)' × (I - λ × W)
2
2  H 2   H4
 H
× (PH - XH × βH) -

+

n 1 H  H
× ×
× Tr
n
2  C2

H  H
1
×
× Tr × (CNL - μC)' × (CNL - μC) = 0
4
n
2  C

(|(4.41)

Solving Eq. (4.39), we obtain the estimator for ̂ H , as follows:
-1
̂ H = [  C2 × XHS' × XHS +  H2 × XH' ×[diag(H')]' ×diag(H') × XH]

× [  C2 × XHS' × PHS +  H2 × XH' × [diag(H')]'× Δ]
where, XHS = (I - λ × W) × XH, and PHS = (I - λ × W) × PH.
from Eq. (4.40), we need to know

(

(4.42)

However, to solve λ

 C2
. By inspection, we have:
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H  H
 C2
Tr
=
× H2 ×
n



|(4.43)

where, Tr = trace{[(I - λ × W)-1]' × (I - λ × W)-1} / n, is defined previously.
Obviously, deriving

Tr
is the key to solve λ.


Totally differentiating Tr with

respect to λ, we have:
1
× d{trace{[(I - λ × W)-1]' × (I - λ × W)-1}}
n
1
= × trace{{d[(I - λ × W)-1]}' × (I - λ × W)-1
n

dTr =

+ [(I - λ × W)-1]' × d[(I - λ × W)-1]}

((see 54,55)((4.44)

Since, d[(I - λ × W)-1] = - (I - λ × W)-1×d(I - λ × W) × (I - λ × W)-1 = (I - λ × W)-1×W
× dλ× (I - λ × W)-1, we can rewrite Eq. (4.44) as:56
1
× trace{[(I - λ × W)-1]' × (I - λ × W)-1 × W × dλ × (I - λ × W)-1}
n
1
+ × trace{[(I - λ × W)-1]' × (I - λ × W)-1 × W × dλ × (I - λ × W)-1}
n
2
= × trace{(I - λ × W)-1 × [(I - λ × W)-1]' × (I - λ × W)-1 × W × dλ}
n
2
= × trace{(I - λ × W)-1 × [(I - λ × W)-1]' × (I - λ × W)-1 × W}× dλ
n

dTr =

(

\|(see 57,58) (4.45)

Tr
× dλ, from Eq. (4.45), we have:

Tr
2
= × trace{(I - λ × W)-1 × [(I - λ × W)-1]' × (I - λ × W)-1 × W}
n


Since dTr =

|((4.46)

54 Here we use the property: d[trace(U)] = trace[d(U)], and d(U') = [d(U)]',
where U is any matrix.
55 Here we use the property: d(U × V) = d(U) × V + U × d(V), where U and
V are any matrices with the appropriate dimension for matrix multiplication.
56 Here we use the property: d(U-1) = - U-1 × d(U) ×U-1, where U is any
invertible matrix.
57 Here we use the property: trace(U × V) = trace(V ×U).
58 Recall that λ is a scalar.
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Now, together with Eqs. (4.43) and (4.46), we can rewrite Eq. (4.40) as follows:

 ln L
1
= 2 × (PH - XH × βH)' × W' × (I - λ × W) × (PH - XH × βH)

H
-

n 1 H  H
2
× 2×
× H2 × × Trλ
n
2 C
n

+

H  H
2
1
×
× H2 × × Trλ × (CNL - μC)' × (CNL - μC) = 0( |(4.47)
4
n
n
2  C

where, Trλ = trace{(I - λ × W)-1 × [(I - λ × W)-1]' × (I - λ × W)-1 × W}. Since it is
difficult to obtain an analytical expression for λ, we need to numerically solve for the
estimator of ̂ .
The estimator for  H2 is also difficult to derive.

Substituting Eqs. (4.36) and

(4.37) into Eq. (4.41) and expanding all the terms, after some rearrangement, we
can rewrite Eq. (4.41) as:
[- 2 × n × (

Tr2 × Φ +

H  H 2
H  H
H  H 2
) × Tr2] × H6 + {- 3 × n ×
× Tr × Ω + (
) ×
n
n
n

H  H
× Tr × [Δ - diag(H') × XH × βH]' × [Δ- diag(H') × XH × βH]} × H4
n

+ [- n × Ω2 - 2 ×

H  H
× Tr × Ω × Φ] × H2 + Ω2 × Φ = 0
n

( (4.48)

where, Ω = [(H ./ PR)' × (H ./ PR) / n] × L2 , and,
Φ = (PH - XH × βH)' × (I - λ × W)' × (I - λ × W) × (PH - XH × βH).
a = - 2 ×n ×(

H  H 2
) × Tr2
n

(

Now, we define:
(4.48a)

136

b = - 3 ×n ×

H  H
H  H 2
H  H
× Tr × Ω + (
) × Tr2 × Φ +
× Tr
n
n
n

× [Δ - diag(H') × XH × βH]' × [Δ- diag(H') × XH × βH]
c = - n × Ω2 - 2 ×

H  H
× Tr × Ω × Φ
n

d = Ω2 × Φ

|(4.48b)
(4.48c)
(|(4.48d)

With these definitions in Eqs. (4.48a) to (4.48d), the seemingly complex Eq. (4.48) is
simply a cubic polynomial of  H2 , which can be expressed as follows:
a × (  H2 )3 + b × (  H2 )2 + c × H2 + d = 0

(|(4.49)

The solution of Eq. (4.49) gives us the estimator for  H2 as follows:59

ˆ H2 =

b
1 / 3
2  a  c  2  b2 / 3
1/ 3
3 a
6 a
a

|(4.50)

where, Γ = 36 × a × b × c - 108 × a2 × d - 8 × b3 + 12 × a × (12 × a × c3 - 3 × b2 ×
c 2 - 54 × a × b ×c × d + 81 × a2 × d2 + 12 × b3 × d)1/2
Once we have obtained all the estimators of the SFIML estimation, we need to
estimate the precision of our results. Hence we need to derive the variance covariance matrix of the SFIML function.

Denoting all the estimated parameters in

the SFIML as θ0, by the property of maximum likelihood estimators, we know that,
asymptotically, the variance - covariance matrix would be {I(θ0)}-1, where I(θ0) is the
information matrix that is defined as follows:

59 Theoretically, there would be three roots for a standard cubic polynomial:
one real root and two imaginary roots. In this study, we only consider the real
root.
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I(θ0) = - E0[

 2 ln L
]
 0  0 '

|||(4.51)

where E0 stands for the expectation of the hessian matrix evaluated at θ0.

I(θ0),

therefore, is presented as follows (see Appendix for its proof):
 I 11 0 0 
I(θ0) =  0 I 22 I 23 
 0 I 32 I 33 

|(4.52)

where:
I11 =

1
× XH' × (I - λ × W)' × (I - λ × W) × XH'
 H2

+

1
× XH' × [diag(H')]' × [diag(H')] × XH
 C2

((4.52a)

I22 = trace{[(I - λ × W)-1]' × W' × W × (I - λ × W)-1}
+

H  H 2
2   H4
×(
) × (Trλ)2
4
n
n  C

1
I23 = I32 = 2 × trace{[(I - λ × W)-1]' × W'} +
H

(

((4.52b)

 H2 

H 'H
 Tr H   H
n
×
×Trλ
n
 C4

(
I33 =

H  H 2
n
n
+
×(
) × Tr2
4
4
n
2  H
2  C

|(4.52c)
((4.52d)

Inverting I(θ0) in Eq. (4.52), we obtain the variance - covariance matrix. With
this variance - covariance matrix, along with the estimators shown in Eqs. (4.42),
(4.47) and (4.50), we can estimate our SFIML model in an iterative manner.60 The

60 On a workstation with 3.0 Ghz quad core CPU and 8 GB RAM, it takes
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estimation results are shown in Tables 4.8, 4.9, and 4.10, for the cases using deflation
only by HPI, monthly time dummy, and both deflation and dummy, respectively.
Overall, our SFIML estimation works fairly well.

The sign of the three key

Project-Attribute Variables are all consistent with our expectation and they are all
statistically significant.

Only one variable in the housing unit attributes, "Close to

street (1=yes)," has a positive sign while we would expect it to be negative.
be due to the 4.project data set that has been used.61

It may

For the cases using deflation

only by HPI, monthly time dummy, and a mixed use of HPI deflation and monthly
dummy, it appears that the mixed one performs the best in the sense that it has the
largest log-likelihood value and smallest sum of square of the estimation residuals.
However, the estimation coefficients and the corresponding t-values are roughly the
same in all cases. With these estimation results, we could implement our hypothesis
test on the validity of the linkage between the land and housing markets, as well as the
profit-maximization behavior of the property developer.

We use the estimation

results of the standard SEM in the separate housing market as a constraint on our
SFIML estimation.

Since we have derived the variance - covariance matrix, a natural

candidate for the test would be the Lagrange multiplier (LM) test.

about 8 to 24 hours to run one round of estimation with the step size of 0.0001
for the three different scenarios. It would be much faster with a larger step size
such as 0.01.
61 If we redo the separate estimation on the housing market using standard
SEM with the same 4-project housing data set rather than the original
6-project one, we get the same sign in this variable.
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Table 4.8
SFIML Estimation of Unit Housing Retail Sales Price, PH (￥/ m2), Using HPI
Deflation
Variable
Intercept

Coefficient
18426.264

t-statistic
2.067

p-value
0.037

-1.718
-1.769
1.006

0.086
0.077
0.314

2.576
299.652
92.645
45.295
-77.571
-43.734
-2.7109
33.223
-18.392
205.657
-0.665
0.654
-73.831

2.390
15.291
4.697
2.170
-3.252
-1.262
-0.142
1.033
-0.666
5.758
-2.688
1.727
-5.685

0.017
0.000
0.000
0.030
0.001
0.207
0.887
0.302
0.506
0.000
0.007
0.084
0.000

0.990

203.235

0.000

Project-Attribute Variables ("PR" and "X1")
Plot Ratio
ln(Subway station proximity)
Road aggregate

-1378.091
-1359.144
293.246

Housing-Unit-Attribute Variables ("H" and "X3")
Floor
Inner view (1=yes)
Outer view (1=yes)
Close to street (1=yes)
North (1=yes)
North East (1=yes)
South East (1=yes)
South (1=yes)
South West (1=yes)
West (1=yes)
Distance to inner source
Housing unit area
Pay in cash (1=yes)
λ
Adjusted R-square
sigma^2
log-likelihood

0.824
21061.913
-26820.193

Dependent variable: Deflated per unit housing retail sales price

We set H0 as "estimation parameters of the separate SEM models in housing
market are valid constraints on the estimation parameters of SFIML." Denoting ̂ HR
as the constraint, we can express the LM statistic as follows:
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Table 4.9
SFIML Estimation of Unit Housing Retail Sales Price, PH (￥/ m2), Using Monthly
Time Dummy
Variable
Intercept

Coefficient
26730.837

t-statistic
2.164

p-value
0.030

-1.671
0.815
-1.900

0.095
0.415
0.057

3.069
14.721
4.496
2.340
-3.101
-1.778
-0.668
0.924
-1.000
5.358
-2.651
1.600
-4.993
0.673
203.235

0.002
0.000
0.000
0.019
0.002
0.075
0.504
0.356
0.317
0.000
0.008
0.110
0.000
0.501
0.000

Project-Attribute Variables ("PR" and "X1")
Plot Ratio
ln(Subway station proximity)
Road aggregate

-1857.599
-2021.866
329.139

Housing-Unit-Attribute Variables ("H" and "X3")
Floor
Inner view (1=yes)
Outer view (1=yes)
Close to street (1=yes)
North (1=yes)
North East (1=yes)
South East (1=yes)
South (1=yes)
South West (1=yes)
West (1=yes)
Distance to inner source
Housing unit area
Pay in cash (1=yes)
Time trend
λ
Adjusted R-square
sigma^2
log-likelihood

4.583
399.713
122.882
67.815
-102.711
-85.622
-17.712
41.176
-38.296
265.153
-0.909
0.845
-89.862
1.951
0.990

0.805
40426.258
-27546.491

Dependent variable: Per unit housing retail sales price

LM = {

1
1
× XH' × (I - λ × W)' × (I - λ × W) × (PH - XH × ̂ HR ) + 2 × XH' ×
2
H
C

[diag(H')]' × [Δ - diag(H') × XH × ̂ HR }' × {I( ̂ HR )}-1 × {

1
× XH' × (I - λ × W)' × (I  H2
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Table 4.10
SFIML Estimation of Unit Housing Retail Sales Price, PH (￥/ m2), Using Both
HPI Deflation and Monthly Dummy
Variable
Intercept

Coefficient
18265.178

t-statistic
2.049

p-value
0.040

-1.741
-1.760
1.035

0.082
0.078
0.301

2.408
15.281
4.688
2.218
-3.186
-1.320
-0.170
1.050
-0.700
5.744
-2.703
1.618
-5.661
0.877
203.235

0.016
0.000
0.000
0.027
0.001
0.187
0.865
0.294
0.484
0.000
0.007
0.106
0.000
0.380
0.000

Project-Attribute Variables ("PR" and "X1")
Plot Ratio
ln(Subway station proximity)
Road aggregate

-1396.282
-1351.383
301.562

Housing-Unit-Attribute Variables ("H" and "X3")
Floor
Inner view (1=yes)
Outer view (1=yes)
Close to street (1=yes)
North (1=yes)
North East (1=yes)
South East (1=yes)
South (1=yes)
South West (1=yes)
West (1=yes)
Distance to inner source
Housing unit area
Pay in cash (1=yes)
Time trend
λ
Adjusted R-square
sigma^2
log-likelihood

2.595
299.412
92.455
46.378
-76.152
-45.872
-3.249
33.757
-19.351
205.136
-0.669
0.616
-73.522
1.835
0.990

0.829
21052.352
-26813.661

Dependent variable: Deflated per unit housing retail sales price

λ × W) × (PH - XH × ̂ HR ) +

1
× XH' ×[diag(H')]' × [Δ - diag(H')× XH × ̂ HR }
 C2

(4.53)

As a result, the values of the LM statistics are 0.411, 0.338, and 0.262 for the cases
using HPI deflation, monthly time dummy, and both HPI deflation and monthly
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dummy, respectively. Therefore, it fails to reject the null hypothesis at the 5%
significance level for all cases.
We consider the "fail to reject" results in the LM test as a positive signal in this
study.

For the separate estimation in the housing market using standard SEM

approach, we have imposed no information about the land market, nor the profit
maximization behavior of the property developer.

However, the property

development activity is a complete process in the sense that it incorporates the factor
market (i.e., the land market), the commodity market (i.e., the housing market), as
well as the profit maximization behavior all together. There has to be a way, at least in
the theoretical level, to link them together with respect to the various characteristics
that could be capitalized in the housing price. Our SFIML approach, as shown
above, has successfully linked these three components together, from theory to
empirical practice. Essentially, the "fail to reject" results in the hypothesis test (i.e.,
the LM test) have statistically proved our theoretical assumption using real world data;
the results have also demonstrated the validity and robustness of the hedonic theory
with both input and output.

In addition, since the property developer acquires raw

land parcels via English auction, our approach has also shown that the derived true
valuation of land works fairly well with the SFIML estimation, which has confirmed
and justified the use of the derived true valuation in the hedonic price estimation.
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6. Concluding Remarks
In this study, we have demonstrated two methods to implement the hypothesis
test on the hedonic price estimation with both input and output, which has been
applied to a Chinese regional land market and housing market.

We focus on the

profit maximization behavior of the property developer, which is the key role to link
the factor market (i.e., the land market) and the commodity market (i.e., the housing
market), as well as the profit maximization behavior in the property development
activity.

Although the housing market is assumed to be competitive and no

economic profit exists, a positive profit is allowed from the premium due to the
difference between the buyer's true valuation and the actual sales price in the English
auction where the raw land parcel is traded with the local government. With the
developer's true valuation of land derived in Chapter 1, we have calculated a non-land
costs in the property development process aside from the land cost.
Two methods are employed to conduct the hypothesis test.

A set of partial

derivatives of the profit function with respect to various characteristics give us the
relationship between the marginal valuations in the land and housing markets, which
then present us the link between the estimation parameters in these two markets, and
also play the role as constraints on the estimation parameters. We also use a joint
estimation approach which considers the land market, the housing market and the
property developer's profit maximization behavior all together in the estimation. We
then use the results in the corresponding separate estimation in the housing market as
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constraints on the parameters.

In the separate estimation model, our results reject

the null hypothesis that the calculated constraints are valid, but it is highly possible to
be due to the fact that our limited number of housing projects in the data set might be
a poor representative of all the land parcels, since the hedonic parameters may vary
from neighborhood to neighborhood as Ellickson (1981) has pointed out.

In the

joint estimation model, our results fail to reject the null hypothesis, which we
consider to be a positive signal to confirm and justify the theoretical linkage (i.e., our
linked markets assumption) in the hedonic price estimation.
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Derivation of the Information Matrix (4.52)
Now, let's look at the derivation of the information matrix, I(θ0), in the SFIML.
In order to obtain the information matrix, the first step is to derive the hessian matrix
of lnL. While some of the second order derivatives are straight forward to obtain,
some are a bit more complex to derive.

The second order condition for βH is

relatively straight forward to derive. Differentiating Eq. (4.40) with respect to βH, we
have:

 2 ln L
 H

2

=-

1
× XH' × (I - λ × W)' × (I - λ × W) × XH
 H2

-

1
× XH' × [diag(H')]' × [diag(H')] × XH
 C2

||(A.1)

2
The second order condition for λ is difficult to obtain. Noting that both  C and

Trλ are functions of λ, by chain rule, we have:
 2 ln L
1
= - 2 × (PH - XH × βH)' × W' × W × (PH - XH × βH)
2

H

+(

where,

 H2  C2 H   H
 H2 H   H Tr
×
×
×
Tr
×
×
)
λ
n
n


 C4
 C2

-

2   H2  C2 H   H 1
×
×
× × Trλ × (CNL - μC)' × (CNL - μC)
n

n
 C6

+

 H2 H   H 1 Tr
×
× ×
× (CNL - μC)' × (CNL - μC)
4
n
n 
C

H  H
 C2
2
=
× H2 × × Trλ, as shown in Eqs. (4.43) and (4.46).
n

n

(A.2)

To obtain

Tr
, denoting ζ = I - λ × W, and totally differentiating Trλ with respect to λ, we have:
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d{trace[ζ-1 × (ζ-1)' × ζ-1 × W]} = trace{d[ζ-1 × (ζ-1)' × ζ-1 × W]}
= trace[d(ζ-1) × (ζ-1)' × ζ-1 × W] + trace{ζ-1 × [d(ζ-1)]' × ζ-1 × W}
+ trace[ζ-1 × (ζ-1)' × d(ζ-1)× W]
= trace[- ζ-1 × d(ζ) × ζ-1 × (ζ-1)' × ζ-1 × W]
+ trace{- ζ-1 × (ζ-1)' × [d(ζ)]' × (ζ-1)' × ζ-1 × W}
+ trace[- ζ-1 × (ζ-1)' × ζ-1 × d(ζ) × ζ-1× W]

|

(A.3)

Noting that d(ζ) = d(I - λ × W) = - W × dλ, and using properties "trace(A × B) =
trace(B × A)" and "trace(A) = trace(A')," after rearrangement, Eq. (A.3) can be
rewritten as:
dTrλ = trace[ζ-1 × (ζ-1)' × ζ-1 × W × ζ-1 × W] × dλ
+ trace[ζ-1 × (ζ-1)' × W' × (ζ-1)' × ζ-1 × W] × dλ
+ trace[ζ-1 × W × ζ-1 × (ζ-1)' × ζ-1× W] × dλ

(A.4)

Therefore, we have:
Tr
= trace[ζ-1 × (ζ-1)' × ζ-1 × W × ζ-1 × W]


+ trace[ζ-1 × (ζ-1)' × W' × (ζ-1)' × ζ-1 × W]
+ trace[ζ-1 × W × ζ-1 × (ζ-1)' × ζ-1× W]
Substituting

 C2
and Eq. (A.5) into Eq. (A.2), we have:


 2 ln L
1
= - 2 × (PH - XH × βH)' × W' × W × (PH - XH × βH)
2

H

|(A.5)
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+(

-

H  H
2
 H2 H   H
 H2 H   H
2
×
×
×
×
Tr
×
×
Tr
×
× Trλλ)

λ
λ
H
n
n
n
n
 C4
 C2

H  H 1
2
2   H2 H   H
2
×
×
×
×
Tr
×
× × Trλ × (CNL - μC)' × (CNL - μC)

λ
H
6
n
n
n
n
C
+

 H2 H   H 1
×
× × Trλλ× (CNL - μC)' × (CNL - μC)
4
n
n
C

(A.6)

where, Trλλ = trace[ζ-1 × (ζ-1)' × ζ-1 × W × ζ-1 × W] + trace[ζ-1 × (ζ-1)' × W' × (ζ-1)' ×
ζ-1 × W] + trace[ζ-1 × W × ζ-1 × (ζ-1)' × ζ-1× W], and ζ = I - λ × W, as shown in Eq.
(A.5).
The second order condition for  H2 is shown as follows:

 2 ln L
1
n
=
- 6 × (PH - XH × βH)' × (I - λ × W)' × (I - λ × W)
2 2
4
( H )
2  H
H
× (PH - XH × βH) +

-

H  H 2
n
×(
) × Tr2
4
n
2  C

H  H 2
1
×
(
) × Tr2 × (CNL - μC)' × (CNL - μC)
6
n
C

| |(A.7)

 2 ln L
 2 ln L
 2 ln L
 2 ln L
The cross-second-order conditions of
(=
) and
(=
)
 H 
 H
 H2
 H2 
are shown in Eqs. (A.8) and (A.9), respectively, as follows:

 2 ln L
 2 ln L
1
=
= - 4 × XH ' × (I - λ × W)' × (I - λ × W) × (PH - XH × βH)
2
2
 H
 H 
H
-

1 H  H
×
× Tr × XH' × [diag(H')]' × [Δ - diag(H') × XH × βH]
n
 C4

(|

(A.8)
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 2 ln L
 2 ln L
2
=
= - 2 × XH' × W' × (I - λ × W) × (PH - XH × βH)
 H 
 H
H
-

1
2 H  H
×
× H2 × × Trλ ×XH' × [diag(H')]' × (CNL - μC)(
4
n
n
C

|(A.9)

 2 ln L
 2 ln L
The cross-second-order condition of
(=
) is a bit more
 H2
 H2 
U dU  V  U  dV
complicated. Noting that " d ( ) 
," along with the chain rule, we have:
V
V2

 2 ln L
 2 ln L
=
 H2
 H2 
=-

1
× (PH - XH × βH)' × W' × (I - λ × W) × (PH - XH × βH)
 H4

 C2   H2 

-

H 'H
 Tr H   H
n
×
× Trλ
4

C

n

H 'H
 Tr H   H
1
n
×
× × Trλ × (CNL - μC)' × (CNL - μC)
6
n
n
C

 C2  2   H2 

+

(

(A.10)

Now, we take expectation on Eqs. (A.1), (A.6), (A.7) to (A.9), and (A.10).
Every term in Eq. (A.1) is non-stochastic, hence its expectation remains the same.
Thus,
E0[

 2 ln L
 H

To obtain E0[

2

]=-

1
× XH' × (I - λ × W)' × (I - λ × W) × XH'
 H2

-

1
× XH' × [diag(H')]' × XH' × [diag(H')]'
 C2

( ((A.11)

 2 ln L
], we need to make expectation on each of the four terms in Eq.
2
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(A.6) one by one. For the first term which we denote by

 2 ln L
1
, "- 2 × (PH - XH
2
 1
H

× βH)' × W' × W × (PH - XH × βH)," we need to substitute PH - XH × βH = (I - λ ×
W)-1 × eH from Eq. (4.33) into it, as follows:
 2 ln L
1
= - 2 × eH' × [(I - λ × W)-1]' × W' × W × (I - λ × W)-1 × eH (||(A.12)
2
 1
H

Denoting M = W × (I - λ × W)-1, by inspection, the element in the ith row of the vector
n

M × eH is

M

ij

 eHj , where j denotes the jth element in the ith row of the matrix M.

j

Therefore, the matrix multiplication (M × eH)' × (M × eH) can be expressed as
n

n

i

j

 ( M ij  eHj )2 . Taking expectation on (M × eH)' × (M × eH), we have:
n

n

i

j

E0[  ( M ij  eHj )2 ] =

n

n

i

j

 E0[( M ij  eHj )2 ]

|(A.13)

n

Noting the fact that E0 [ M ij  eHj ] = 0, using the definition of variance, Eq.
j

(A.13) can be rewritten as follows:
n

n

i

j

 E0[( M ij  eHj )2 ] =

n

n

i

j

Var0[ M ij  eHj ] =
n

n

i

j

n

n

i

j

 ( M ij2   H2 )

=  H2    M ij2 =  H2 × trace(M' × M) ( ||(A.14)
Therefore, combining Eqs. (A.12) and (A.14), we have:
E0[

 2 ln L
] = - trace{[(I - λ × W)-1]' × W' × W × (I - λ × W)-1}
2
 1

|(A.15)
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The second term of Eq. (A.6),

 2 ln L
, is non-stochastic, hence, its
2 2

expectation remains the same, i.e.,
E0[

H  H 2
 2 ln L
2   H4
 H2 H   H
2
]
=
×
(
)
×
(Tr
)
×
× Trλλ
λ
n
n
n   C4
 C2
2 2

|| (A.16)

Realizing the fact that,
E0[(CNL - μC)' × (CNL - μC)] = n× C2
The expectation of the third and fourth terms of Eq. (A.6), i.e.,

(A.17)
 2 ln L
 2 ln L
and
,
2 3
2 4

can be expressed in Eqs. (A.18) and (A.19), respectively, as follows:
E0[

H  H 2
 2 ln L
4   H4
]
=
×(
) × (Trλ)2
2
4
n
n  C
 3

E0[

 2 ln L
 H2 H   H
]
=
×
× Trλλ
n
 C2
2 4

|(A.18)

(|(A.19)

Adding up Eqs. (A.15), (A.16), (A.18), and (A.19), we have:
E0[

 2 ln L
] = - trace{[(I - λ × W)-1]' × W' × W × (I - λ × W)-1}
2


+(

-

H  H 2
2   H4
 H2 H   H
2
×
(
)
×
(Tr
)
×
× Trλλ)
λ
n
n
n   C4
 C2

H  H 2
4   H4
 H2 H   H
2
×
(
)
×
(Tr
)
+
×
× Trλλ
λ
n
n
n   C4
 C2

= - trace{[(I - λ × W)-1]' × W' × W × (I - λ × W)-1}
-

H  H 2
2   H4
×
(
) × (Trλ)2
4
n
n  C

|(A.20)

Realizing the fact that the term E0[eH' × eH] is nothing but n× H2 , we have:
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E0[(PH - XH × βH)' × (I - λ × W)' × (I - λ × W)× (PH - XH × βH)] = n× H2
|(A.21)

\

Therefore, considering Eqs. (A.17) and (A.21), when taking expectation, Eq. (A.7)
can be transformed as:
E0[

 2 ln L
H  H 2
n
n
]=×
(
) × Tr2
2 2
4
4
n
( H )
2  H
2  C

(A.22)

Noting the fact that E0[PH - XH × βH] = (I - λ × W)-1 × E0[eH] = 0, and also
E0[CNL - μC] = 0, from Eq. (A.8) we have:

 2 ln L
 2 ln L
E0[
] = E0[ 2 ] = 0
 H2
 H 

( ( ( (A.23)

In a similar manner, from Eq. (A.9), we have:
E0[

 2 ln L
 2 ln L
] = E0[
]=0
 H 
 H

(

((A.24)

 2 ln L
 2 ln L
The expectation of
(=
) is relatively more complicated than the
 H2
 H2 
previous two. Again, by Eq. (4.33), we can rewrite the first term of Eq. (A.10), which
 2 ln L
, as follows:
 H2 1

we denote by
 2 ln L
 H2

=-

1
× eH' × [(I - λ × W)-1]' × W' × (I - λ × W) × (I - λ × W)-1 × eH
4
H

=-

1
× eH' × [(I - λ × W)-1]' × W' × eH
4
H

1

( (A.25)

Denoting Q = W', along with the notation of P = (I - λ × W)-1, by inspection, the
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element in the ith row of the vector P × eH is

n

P e
ij

Hj

, and the element in the ith

j

n

row of the vector Q ×eH is

Q

ij

 eHj , where j denotes the jth element in the ith row

j

of the matrix P and Q respectively. Therefore, we can express the matrix
multiplication (P ×eH)' × (Q ×eH) as:
n

n

n

i

j

j

 [( Pij  eHj )  ( Qij  eHj )]

(P × eH)' × (Q × eH) =

|(A.26)

In order to take expectation on Eq. (A.26), we note the fact that
n

n

j

j

E0 [ Pij  eHj ] = 0, and also E0 [ Qij  eHj ] = 0. Then, with the definition of
covariance, we have:
n

n

n

i

j

j

E0{ [( Pij  eHj )  ( Qij  eHj )]} =
n

=

n

0

ij

i

=

n

 Cov ( P  e , Q
Hj

j

n

n

n

i

j

j

ij

 eHj ) =

j

n

n

n

i

j

j

 E0[( Pij  eHj )  ( Qij  eHj )]
n

n

n

i

j

j

n

n

n

i

j

j

 { [Cov ( P  e
0

{[ Pij  Qij  Cov0 (eHj , eHj )]} =
n

n

i

j

ij

Hj

, Qij  eHj )]}

[ ( Pij  Qij   H2 )]

=  H2   ( Pij  Qij )
=  H2  trace( P'Q)

(

|(see 62,63,64,65) (A.27)

n

m

n

m

i

j

i

j

62 Here we use the property: Cov( X i ,  Y j )   [Cov( X i , Y j )] .
63 Here we use the property: Cov(a  X , b  Y )  a  b  Cov( X , Y ) .
64 Here we use the property:

n

n

j

j

 ( X

n

j )  (X j ) .
j
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Therefore, when taking expectation, Eq. (A.25) can be rewritten as follows:
E0[

1
 2 ln L
] = - 2 × trace{[(I - λ × W)-1]' × W'}
2
H
 H 1

The second term of Eq. (A.10),

 ln L
]= H2 2
2

E0[

 C2   H2 

(A.28)

 2 ln L
, is non-stochastic, hence, we have:
 H2 2

H 'H
 Tr H   H
n
×
× Trλ
4

C

|| (A.29)

n

In addition, by Eq. (A.17), the third term of Eq. (A.10),

 2 ln L
, when taking
 H2 3

expectation, can be expressed as follows:
 ln L
]=
 H2 3
2

E0[

H 'H
 Tr H   H
n
×
× Trλ
4

 C2  2   H2 
C

n

(A.30)

Adding up Eqs. (A.28) to (A.30), we finally have:

 2 ln L
 2 ln L
1
E0[
] = E0[ 2 ] = - 2 × trace{[(I - λ × W)-1]' × W'
2
 H
 H 
H
 H2 

-

H 'H
 Tr H   H
n
×
×Trλ
n
 C4

|(A.31)

Now we have all the information we need to form the information matrix,
which we denote as I(θ0).

Substituting Eqs. (A.11), (A.20), (A.22) to (A.24) and

(A.31) into Eq. (4.53), we have:

n

n

i

j

65 Here we use the property: trace( A'B)   (aij  bij ) .
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 2 ln L
 2 ln L
 2 ln L 
]  E0 [
]
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